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Candogan et al. (2011) provide an orthogonal direct-sum decomposition of finite games into potential, harmonic and nonstrategic components. In this paper we study the issue of decomposing games that are strategically equivalent from a game-theoretical point of view, for instance games obtained via transformations such as duplications of strategies or positive affine mappings of of payoffs. We show the need to define classes of decompositions to achieve commutativity of game transformations and decompositions.
In this paper we describe an approach to resolve strategic games in which players can assume different types along the game. Our goal is to infer which type the opponent is adopting at each moment so that we can increase the players odds. To achieve
It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic leading to
In this paper we introduce a novel flow representation for finite games in strategic form. This representation allows us to develop a canonical direct sum decomposition of an arbitrary game into three components, which we refer to as the potential, h
We consider the question of whether, and in what sense, Wardrop equilibria provide a good approximation for Nash equilibria in atomic unsplittable congestion games with a large number of small players. We examine two different definitions of small pl
Stochastic games, introduced by Shapley, model adversarial interactions in stochastic environments where two players choose their moves to optimize a discounted-sum of rewards. In the traditional discounted reward semantics, long-term weights are geo