اشترك بالحزمة الذهبية واحصل على وصول غير محدود شمرا أكاديميا
تسجيل مستخدم جديدStealing Neural Networks via Timing Side Channels
105
0
0.0
(
0
)
اسأل ChatGPT حول البحث
ﻻ يوجد ملخص باللغة العربية
Deep learning is gaining importance in many applications. However, Neural Networks face several security and privacy threats. This is particularly significant in the scenario where Cloud infrastructures deploy a service with Neural Network model at the back end. Here, an adversary can extract the Neural Network parameters, infer the regularization hyperparameter, identify if a data point was part of the training data, and generate effective transferable adversarial examples to evade classifiers. This paper shows how a Neural Network model is susceptible to timing side channel attack. In this paper, a black box Neural Network extraction attack is proposed by exploiting the timing side channels to infer the depth of the network. Although, constructing an equivalent architecture is a complex search problem, it is shown how Reinforcement Learning with knowledge distillation can effectively reduce the search space to infer a target model. The proposed approach has been tested with VGG architectures on CIFAR10 data set. It is observed that it is possible to reconstruct substitute models with test accuracy close to the target models and the proposed approach is scalable and independent of type of Neural Network architectures.
قيم البحث
اقرأ أيضاً
Graph data, such as chemical networks and social networks, may be deemed confidential/private because the data owner often spends lots of resources collecting the data or the data contains sensitive information, e.g., social relationships. Recently,
neural networks were extended to graph data, which are known as graph neural networks (GNNs). Due to their superior performance, GNNs have many applications, such as healthcare analytics, recommender systems, and fraud detection. In this work, we propose the first attacks to steal a graph from the outputs of a GNN model that is trained on the graph. Specifically, given a black-box access to a GNN model, our attacks can infer whether there exists a link between any pair of nodes in the graph used to train the model. We call our attacks link stealing attacks. We propose a threat model to systematically characterize an adversarys background knowledge along three dimensions which in total leads to a comprehensive taxonomy of 8 different link stealing attacks. We propose multiple novel methods to realize these 8 attacks. Extensive experiments on 8 real-world datasets show that our attacks are effective at stealing links, e.g., AUC (area under the ROC curve) is above 0.95 in multiple cases. Our results indicate that the outputs of a GNN model reveal rich information about the structure of the graph used to train the model.
With the recent advancements in machine learning theory, many commercial embedded micro-processors use neural network models for a variety of signal processing applications. However, their associated side-channel security vulnerabilities pose a major
concern. There have been several proof-of-concept attacks demonstrating the extraction of their model parameters and input data. But, many of these attacks involve specific assumptions, have limited applicability, or pose huge overheads to the attacker. In this work, we study the side-channel vulnerabilities of embedded neural network implementations by recovering their parameters using timing-based information leakage and simple power analysis side-channel attacks. We demonstrate our attacks on popular micro-controller platforms over networks of different precisions such as floating point, fixed point, binary networks. We are able to successfully recover not only the model parameters but also the inputs for the above networks. Countermeasures against timing-based attacks are implemented and their overheads are analyzed.
We show that subtle acoustic noises emanating from within computer screens can be used to detect the content displayed on the screens. This sound can be picked up by ordinary microphones built into webcams or screens, and is inadvertently transmitted
to other parties, e.g., during a videoconference call or archived recordings. It can also be recorded by a smartphone or smart speaker placed on a desk next to the screen, or from as far as 10 meters away using a parabolic microphone. Empirically demonstrating various attack scenarios, we show how this channel can be used for real-time detection of on-screen text, or users input into on-screen virtual keyboards. We also demonstrate how an attacker can analyze the audio received during video call (e.g., on Google Hangout) to infer whether the other side is browsing the web in lieu of watching the video call, and which web site is displayed on their screen.
Recent work has introduced attacks that extract the architecture information of deep neural networks (DNN), as this knowledge enhances an adversarys capability to conduct black-box attacks against the model. This paper presents the first in-depth sec
urity analysis of DNN fingerprinting attacks that exploit cache side-channels. First, we define the threat model for these attacks: our adversary does not need the ability to query the victim model; instead, she runs a co-located process on the host machine victims deep learning (DL) system is running and passively monitors the accesses of the target functions in the shared framework. Second, we introduce DeepRecon, an attack that reconstructs the architecture of the victim network by using the internal information extracted via Flush+Reload, a cache side-channel technique. Once the attacker observes function invocations that map directly to architecture attributes of the victim network, the attacker can reconstruct the victims entire network architecture. In our evaluation, we demonstrate that an attacker can accurately reconstruct two complex networks (VGG19 and ResNet50) having observed only one forward propagation. Based on the extracted architecture attributes, we also demonstrate that an attacker can build a meta-model that accurately fingerprints the architecture and family of the pre-trained model in a transfer learning setting. From this meta-model, we evaluate the importance of the observed attributes in the fingerprinting process. Third, we propose and evaluate new framework-level defense techniques that obfuscate our attackers observations. Our empirical security analysis represents a step toward understanding the DNNs vulnerability to cache side-channel attacks.
Deep neural networks have achieved state-of-the-art performance on various tasks. However, lack of interpretability and transparency makes it easier for malicious attackers to inject trojan backdoor into the neural networks, which will make the model
behave abnormally when a backdoor sample with a specific trigger is input. In this paper, we propose NeuronInspect, a framework to detect trojan backdoors in deep neural networks via output explanation techniques. NeuronInspect first identifies the existence of backdoor attack targets by generating the explanation heatmap of the output layer. We observe that generated heatmaps from clean and backdoored models have different characteristics. Therefore we extract features that measure the attributes of explanations from an attacked model namely: sparse, smooth and persistent. We combine these features and use outlier detection to figure out the outliers, which is the set of attack targets. We demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of NeuronInspect on MNIST digit recognition dataset and GTSRB traffic sign recognition dataset. We extensively evaluate NeuronInspect on different attack scenarios and prove better robustness and effectiveness over state-of-the-art trojan backdoor detection techniques Neural Cleanse by a great margin.
الأسئلة المقترحة
سجل دخول لتتمكن من نشر تعليقات
التعليقات
جاري جلب التعليقات
سجل دخول لتتمكن من متابعة معايير البحث التي قمت باختيارها
