ﻻ يوجد ملخص باللغة العربية
We present an approach for implementing a specific form of collaborative industrial practices-called Industrial Symbiotic Networks (ISNs)-as MC-Net cooperative games and address the so called ISN implementation problem. This is, the characteristics of ISNs may lead to inapplicability of fair and stable benefit allocation methods even if the collaboration is a collectively desired one. Inspired by realistic ISN scenarios and the literature on normative multi-agent systems, we consider regulations and normative socioeconomic policies as two elements that in combination with ISN games resolve the situation and result in the concept of coordinated ISNs.
In this paper, we introduce a game-theoretical formulation for a specific form of collaborative industrial relations called Industrial Symbiotic Relation (ISR) games and provide a formal framework to model, verify, and support collaboration decisions
This paper discusses the dynamics of Transaction Cost (TC) in Industrial Symbiosis Institutions (ISI) and provides a fair and stable mechanism for TC allocation among the involved firms in a given ISI. In principle, industrial symbiosis, as an implem
One practical requirement in solving dynamic games is to ensure that the players play well from any decision point onward. To satisfy this requirement, existing efforts focus on equilibrium refinement, but the scalability and applicability of existin
In this paper we introduce a qualitative decision and game theory based on belief (B) and desire (D) rules. We show that a group of agents acts as if it is maximizing achieved joint goals.
Recent years have witnessed significant advances in technologies and services in modern network applications, including smart grid management, wireless communication, cybersecurity as well as multi-agent autonomous systems. Considering the heterogene