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تسجيل مستخدم جديدRestoring Uniqueness to Mean-Field Games by Randomizing the Equilibria
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Francois Delarue
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We here address the question of restoration of uniqueness in mean-field games deriving from deterministic differential games with a large number of players. The general strategy for restoring uniqueness is inspired from earlier similar results on ordinary and stochastic differential equations. It consists in randomizing the equilibria through an external noise. As a main feature, we choose the external noise as an infinite dimensional Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. We first investigate existence and uniqueness of a solution to the noisy system made of the mean-field game forced by the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. We also show how such a noisy system can be interpreted as the limit version of a stochastic differential game with a large number of players.
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