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Melamed, Harrell, and Simpson have recently reported on an experiment which appears to show that cooperation can arise in a dynamic network without reputational knowledge, i.e., purely via dynamics [1]. We believe that their experimental design is actually not testing this, in so far as players do know the last action of their current partners before making a choice on their own next action and subsequently deciding which link to cut. Had the authors given no information at all, the result would be a decline in cooperation as shown in [2].
Many real world, complex phenomena have underlying structures of evolving networks where nodes and links are added and removed over time. A central scientific challenge is the description and explanation of network dynamics, with a key test being the
It has recently become possible to record detailed social interactions in large social systems with high resolution. As we study these datasets, human social interactions display patterns that emerge at multiple time scales, from minutes to months. O
In the framework of the evolutionary dynamics of the Prisoners Dilemma game on complex networks, we investigate the possibility that the average level of cooperation shows hysteresis under quasi-static variations of a model parameter (the temptation
Most infectious diseases spread on a dynamic network of human interactions. Recent studies of social dynamics have provided evidence that spreading patterns may depend strongly on detailed micro-dynamics of the social system. We have recorded every s
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