اشترك بالحزمة الذهبية واحصل على وصول غير محدود شمرا أكاديميا
تسجيل مستخدم جديدIrreversible investment with fixed adjustment costs: a stochastic impulse control approach
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We consider an optimal stochastic impulse control problem over an infinite time horizon motivated by a model of irreversible investment choices with fixed adjustment costs. By employing techniques of viscosity solutions and relying on semiconvexity arguments, we prove that the value function is a classical solution to the associated quasi-variational inequality. This enables us to characterize the structure of the continuation and action regions and construct an optimal control. Finally, we focus on the linear case, discussing, by a numerical analysis, the sensitivity of the solution with respect to the relevant parameters of the problem.
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