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Very often in some censorious healthcare scenario, there may be a need to have some expert consultancies (especially by doctors) that are not available in-house to the hospital. With the advancement in technologies (such as video conferencing, smartphone, etc.), it has become reality that, for the critical medical cases in the hospitals, expert consultants (ECs) from around the world could be hired, who will serve the patients by their physical or virtual presence. Earlier, this interesting healthcare scenario of hiring the ECs (mainly doctors) from outside of the hospitals had been studied with the robust concepts of mechanism design with or without money. We have tried to model the ECs (mainly doctors) hiring problem as a two-sided matching problem. In this paper, for the first time, to the best of our knowledge, we explore the more realistic two-sided matching in our set-up, where the members of the two participating communities, namely patients and doctors are revealing the strict preference ordering over all the members of the opposite community for a stipulated amount of time. We assume that patients and doctors are strategic in nature. With the theoretical analysis, we demonstrate that the proposed mechanism that results in a stable allocation of doctors to patients is strategy-proof (or truthful) and optimal. The proposed mechanism is also validated with exhaustive experiments.
The doctors (or expert consultants) are the critical resources on which the success of critical medical cases are heavily dependent. With the emerging technologies (such as video conferencing, smartphone, etc.) this is no longer a dream but a fact, t
Throughout the past decade, there has been an extensive research on scheduling the hospital resources such as the operation theatre(s) (OTs) and the experts (such as nurses, doctors etc.) inside the hospitals. With the technological growth, mainly ad
We initiate the use of a multi-layer neural network to model two-sided matching and to explore the design space between strategy-proofness and stability. It is well known that both properties cannot be achieved simultaneously but the efficient fronti
Two-sided matching platforms provide users with menus of match recommendations. To maximize the number of realized matches between the two sides (referred here as customers and suppliers), the platform must balance the inherent tension between recomm
This paper is an attempt to deal with the recent realization (Vazirani, Yannakakis 2021) that the Hylland-Zeckhauser mechanism, which has remained a classic in economics for one-sided matching markets, is likely to be highly intractable. HZ uses the