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تسجيل مستخدم جديدQuality adaptive online double auction in participatory sensing
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Agents (specially humans) with smart devices are stemming with astounding rapidity and that may play a big role in information and communication technology apart from being used only as a mere calling devices. Inculcating the power of smart devices carried by the agents in several different applications is commonly termed as participatory sensing (PS). In this paper, for the first time a truthful quality adaptive participatory sensing is presented in an online double auction environment. The proposed algorithm is simulated with a benchmark mechanism that adapts the existing McAfees Double Auction (MDA) directly in the online environment.
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