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Practical quantum communication (QC) protocols are assumed to be secure provided implemented devices are properly characterized and all known side channels are closed. We show that this is not always true. We demonstrate a laser-damage attack capable of modifying device behaviour on-demand. We test it on two practical QC systems for key distribution and coin-tossing, and show that newly created deviations lead to side channels. This reveals that laser damage is a potential security risk to existing QC systems, and necessitates their testing to guarantee security.
We propose a class of attacks on quantum key distribution (QKD) systems where an eavesdropper actively engineers new loopholes by using damaging laser illumination to permanently change properties of system components. This can turn a perfect QKD sys
This tutorial reviews the Holevo capacity limit as a universal tool to analyze the ultimate transmission rates in a variety of optical communication scenarios, ranging from conventional optically amplified fiber links to free-space communication with
Concerted efforts are underway to establish an infrastructure for a global quantum internet to realise a spectrum of quantum technologies. This will enable more precise sensors, secure communications, and faster data processing. Quantum communication
Conversion of vacuum fluctuations into real particles was first predicted by L. Parker considering an expanding universe, followed in S. Hawkings work on black hole radiation. Since their experimental observation is challenging, analogue systems have
By harnessing quantum effects, we nowadays can use encryption that is in principle proven to withstand any conceivable attack. These fascinating quantum features have been implemented in metropolitan quantum networks around the world. In order to int