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تسجيل مستخدم جديدCracking Intel Sandy Bridges Cache Hash Function
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On Intel Sandy Bridge processor, last level cache (LLC) is divided into cache slices and all physical addresses are distributed across the cache slices using an hash function. With this undocumented hash function existing, it is impossible to implement cache partition based on page coloring. This article cracks the hash functions on two types of Intel Sandy processors by converting the problem of cracking the hash function to the problem of classifying data blocks into different groups based on eviction relationship existing between data blocks that are mapped to the same cache set. Based on the cracking result, this article proves that its possible to implement cache partition based on page coloring on cache indexed by hashing.
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