اشترك بالحزمة الذهبية واحصل على وصول غير محدود شمرا أكاديميا
تسجيل مستخدم جديدPrisoners Dilemma on Graphs with Large Girth
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We study the evolution of cooperation in populations where individuals play prisoners dilemma on a network. Every node of the network corresponds on an individual choosing whether to cooperate or defect in a repeated game. The players revise their actions by imitating those neighbors who have higher payoffs. We show that when the interactions take place on graphs with large girth, cooperation is more likely to emerge. On the flip side, in graphs with many cycles of length 3 and 4, defection spreads more rapidly. One of the key ideas of our analysis is that our dynamics can be seen as a perturbation of the voter model. We write the transition kernel of the corresponding Markov chain in terms of the pairwise correlations in the voter model. We analyze the pairwise correlation and show that in graphs with relatively large girth, cooperators cluster and help each other.
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