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We consider a one-sided assignment market or exchange network with transferable utility and propose a model for the dynamics of bargaining in such a market. Our dynamical model is local, involving iterative updates of offers based on estimated best alternative matches, in the spirit of pairwise Nash bargaining. We establish that when a balanced outcome (a generalization of the pairwise Nash bargaining solution to networks) exists, our dynamics converges rapidly to such an outcome. We extend our results to the cases of (i) general agent capacity constraints, i.e., an agent may be allowed to participate in multiple matches, and (ii) unequal bargaining powers (where we also find a surprising change in rate of convergence).
Bargaining networks model the behavior of a set of players that need to reach pairwise agreements for making profits. Nash bargaining solutions are special outcomes of such games that are both stable and balanced. Kleinberg and Tardos proved a sharp
We study decentralized markets with the presence of middlemen, modeled by a non-cooperative bargaining game in trading networks. Our goal is to investigate how the network structure of the market and the role of middlemen influence the markets effici
We consider bargaining problems which involve two participants, with a nonempty closed, bounded convex bargaining set of points in the real plane representing all realizable bargains. We also assume that there is no definite threat or disagreement po
There has been much work on exhibiting mechanisms that implement various bargaining solutions, in particular, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution cite{moulin1984implementing} and the Nash Bargaining solution. Another well-known and axiomatically well-stud
Shapleys impossibility result indicates that the two-person bargaining problem has no non-trivial ordinal solution with the traditional game-theoretic bargaining model. Although the result is no longer true for bargaining problems with more than two