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We consider bargaining problems which involve two participants, with a nonempty closed, bounded convex bargaining set of points in the real plane representing all realizable bargains. We also assume that there is no definite threat or disagreement point which will provide the default bargain if the players cannot agree on some point in the bargaining set. However, there is a nondeterministic threat: if the players fail to agree on a bargain, one of them will be chosen at random with equal probability, and that chosen player will select any realizable bargain as the solution, subject to a reasonable restriction.
This paper addresses the paucity of models of matching markets, both one-sided and two-sided, when utility functions of agents are cardinal. The classical Hylland-Zeckhauser scheme cite{hylland}, which is the most prominent such model in economics, c
This paper is an attempt to deal with the recent realization (Vazirani, Yannakakis 2021) that the Hylland-Zeckhauser mechanism, which has remained a classic in economics for one-sided matching markets, is likely to be highly intractable. HZ uses the
We study decentralized markets with the presence of middlemen, modeled by a non-cooperative bargaining game in trading networks. Our goal is to investigate how the network structure of the market and the role of middlemen influence the markets effici
Shapleys impossibility result indicates that the two-person bargaining problem has no non-trivial ordinal solution with the traditional game-theoretic bargaining model. Although the result is no longer true for bargaining problems with more than two
Bargaining networks model the behavior of a set of players that need to reach pairwise agreements for making profits. Nash bargaining solutions are special outcomes of such games that are both stable and balanced. Kleinberg and Tardos proved a sharp