اشترك بالحزمة الذهبية واحصل على وصول غير محدود شمرا أكاديميا
تسجيل مستخدم جديدUnderstanding the emergence and deployment of nano S&T
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As an introduction to the special issue on emerging nanotechnologies, this paper puts in perspective contemporary debates and challenges about nanotechnology. It presents an overview of diverse analyses and expectations about this presumably revolutionary set of technological, scientific and industrial developments. Three main lines of argument can then be delineated: first of all, the degree of cumulativeness of science and technologies and the respective roles of newcomers and incumbents in the industrial dynamics; second the knowledge dynamics in nanotechnologies, especially the linkages by science and technology and third the role of institutions (network, geographic agglomeration and job market). It finally discusses methodologies to delineate the field of nanotechnologies and to collect data.
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