ﻻ يوجد ملخص باللغة العربية
We construct explicit solutions of a number of Stieltjes moment problems based on moments of the form ${rho}_{1}^{(r)}(n)=(2rn)!$ and ${rho}_{2}^{(r)}(n)=[(rn)!]^{2}$, $r=1,2,...$, $n=0,1,2,...$, textit{i.e.} we find functions $W^{(r)}_{1,2}(x)>0$ satisfying $int_{0}^{infty}x^{n}W^{(r)}_{1,2}(x)dx = {rho}_{1,2}^{(r)}(n)$. It is shown using criteria for uniqueness and non-uniqueness (Carleman, Krein, Berg, Pakes, Stoyanov) that for $r>1$ both ${rho}_{1,2}^{(r)}(n)$ give rise to non-unique solutions. Examples of such solutions are constructed using the technique of the inverse Mellin transform supplemented by a Mellin convolution. We outline a general method of generating non-unique solutions for moment problems generalizing ${rho}_{1,2}^{(r)}(n)$, such as the product ${rho}_{1}^{(r)}(n)cdot{rho}_{2}^{(r)}(n)$ and $[(rn)!]^{p}$, $p=3,4,...$.
The Stieltjes moment problem is studied in the framework of general Gelfand-Shilov spaces defined via weight sequences. We characterize the injectivity and surjectivity of the Stieltjes moment mapping, sending a function to its sequence of moments, i
Let $ast_P$ be a product on $l_{rm{fin}}$ (a space of all finite sequences) associated with a fixed family $(P_n)_{n=0}^{infty}$ of real polynomials on $mathbb{R}$. In this article, using methods from the theory of generalized eigenvector expansion,
These lecture notes are meant to accompany two lectures given at the CDM 2016 conference, about the Kadison-Singer Problem. They are meant to complement the survey by the same authors (along with Spielman) which appeared at the 2014 ICM. In the first
Given a domain $Omega$ in $mathbb{C}^m$, and a finite set of points $z_1,ldots, z_nin Omega$ and $w_1,ldots, w_nin mathbb{D}$ (the open unit disc in the complex plane), the $Pick, interpolation, problem$ asks when there is a holomorphic function $f:O
The theory of mean field games is a tool to understand noncooperative dynamic stochastic games with a large number of players. Much of the theory has evolved under conditions ensuring uniqueness of the mean field game Nash equilibrium. However, in so