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تسجيل مستخدم جديدOptimal Strategies in Sequential Bidding
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We are interested in mechanisms that maximize social welfare. In [1] this problem was studied for multi-unit auctions with unit demand bidders and for the public project problem, and in each case social welfare undominated mechanisms in the class of feasible and incentive compatible mechanisms were identified. One way to improve upon these optimality results is by allowing the players to move sequentially. With this in mind, we study here sequentia
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