We study a class of games which model the competition among agents to access some service provided by distributed service units and which exhibit congestion and frustration phenomena when service units have limited capacity. We propose a technique, b
ased on the cavity method of statistical physics, to characterize the full spectrum of Nash equilibria of the game. The analysis reveals a large variety of equilibria, with very different statistical properties. Natural selfish dynamics, such as best-response, usually tend to large-utility equilibria, even though those of smaller utility are exponentially more numerous. Interestingly, the latter actually can be reached by selecting the initial conditions of the best-response dynamics close to the saturation limit of the service unit capacities. We also study a more realistic stochastic variant of the game by means of a simple and effective approximation of the average over the random parameters, showing that the properties of the average-case Nash equilibria are qualitatively similar to the deterministic ones.
We develop a computationally efficient technique to solve a fairly general distributed service provision problem with selfish users and imperfect information. In particular, in a context in which the service capacity of the existing infrastructure ca
n be partially adapted to the user load by activating just some of the service units, we aim at finding the configuration of active service units that achieves the best trade-off between maintenance (e.g. energetic) costs for the provider and user satisfaction. The core of our technique resides in the implementation of a belief-propagation (BP) algorithm to evaluate the cost configurations. Numerical results confirm the effectiveness of our approach.
The problem of targeted network immunization can be defined as the one of finding a subset of nodes in a network to immunize or vaccinate in order to minimize a tradeoff between the cost of vaccination and the final (stationary) expected infection un
der a given epidemic model. Although computing the expected infection is a hard computational problem, simple and efficient mean-field approximations have been put forward in the literature in recent years. The optimization problem can be recast into a constrained one in which the constraints enforce local mean-field equations describing the average stationary state of the epidemic process. For a wide class of epidemic models, including the susceptible-infected-removed and the susceptible-infected-susceptible models, we define a message-passing approach to network immunization that allows us to study the statistical properties of epidemic outbreaks in the presence of immunized nodes as well as to find (nearly) optimal immunization sets for a given choice of parameters and costs. The algorithm scales linearly with the size of the graph and it can be made efficient even on large networks. We compare its performance with topologically based heuristics, greedy methods, and simulated annealing.
Inverse phase transitions are striking phenomena in which an apparently more ordered state disorders under cooling. This behavior can naturally emerge in tricritical systems on heterogeneous networks and it is strongly enhanced by the presence of dis
assortative degree correlations. We show it both analytically and numerically, providing also a microscopic interpretation of inverse transitions in terms of freezing of sparse subgraphs and coupling renormalization.
We consider any network environment in which the best shot game is played. This is the case where the possible actions are only two for every node (0 and 1), and the best response for a node is 1 if and only if all her neighbors play 0. A natural app
lication of the model is one in which the action 1 is the purchase of a good, which is locally a public good, in the sense that it will be available also to neighbors. This game typically exhibits a great multiplicity of equilibria. Imagine a social planner whose scope is to find an optimal equilibrium, i.e. one in which the number of nodes playing 1 is minimal. To find such an equilibrium is a very hard task for any non-trivial network architecture. We propose an implementable mechanism that, in the limit of infinite time, reaches an optimal equilibrium, even if this equilibrium and even the network structure is unknown to the social planner.
The graph theoretic concept of maximal independent set arises in several practical problems in computer science as well as in game theory. A maximal independent set is defined by the set of occupied nodes that satisfy some packing and covering constr
aints. It is known that finding minimum and maximum-density maximal independent sets are hard optimization problems. In this paper, we use cavity method of statistical physics and Monte Carlo simulations to study the corresponding constraint satisfaction problem on random graphs. We obtain the entropy of maximal independent sets within the replica symmetric and one-step replica symmetry breaking frameworks, shedding light on the metric structure of the landscape of solutions and suggesting a class of possible algorithms. This is of particular relevance for the application to the study of strategic interactions in social and economic networks, where maximal independent sets correspond to pure Nash equilibria of a graphical game of public goods allocation.
