A recent paper [Phys. Rev. E 87, 062114 (2013)] presents numerical simulations on a system exhibiting directed ratchet transport of a driven overdamped Brownian particle subjected to a spatially periodic, symmetric potential. The authors claim that t
heir simulations prove the existence of a universal waveform of the external force which optimally enhances directed transport, hence confirming the validity of a previous conjecture put forward by one of them in the limit of vanishing noise intensity. With minor corrections due to noise, the conjecture holds even in the presence of noise, according to the authors. On the basis of their results the authors claim that all previous theories, which predict a different optimal force waveform, are incorrect. In this comment we provide sufficient numerical evidence showing that there is no such universal force waveform and that the evidence obtained by the authors otherwise is due to a fortunate choice of the parameters. Our simulations also suggest that previous theories correctly predict the shape of the optimal waveform within their validity regime, namely when the forcing is weak. On the contrary, the aforementioned conjecture is shown to be wrong.
Eigens quasi-species model describes viruses as ensembles of different mutants of a high fitness master genotype. Mutants are assumed to have lower fitness than the master type, yet they coexist with it forming the quasi-species. When the mutation ra
te is sufficiently high, the master type no longer survives and gets replaced by a wide range of mutant types, thus destroying the quasi-species. It is the so-called error catastrophe. But natural selection acts on phenotypes, not genotypes, and huge amounts of genotypes yield the same phenotype. An important consequence of this is the appearance of beneficial mutations which increase the fitness of mutants. A model has been recently proposed to describe quasi-species in the presence of beneficial mutations. This model lacks the error catastrophe of Eigens model and predicts a steady state in which the viral population grows exponentially. Extinction can only occur if the infectivity of the quasi-species is so low that this exponential is negative. In this work I investigate the transient of this model when infection is started from a small amount of low fitness virions. I prove that, beyond an initial regime where viral population decreases (and can go extinct), the growth of the population is super-exponential. Hence this population quickly becomes so huge that selection due to lack of host cells to be infected begins to act before the steady state is reached. This result suggests that viral infection may widespread before the virus has developed its optimal form.
Our understanding of the evolutionary process has gone a long way since the publication, 150 years ago, of On the origin of species by Charles R. Darwin. The XXth Century witnessed great efforts to embrace replication, mutation, and selection within
the framework of a formal theory, able eventually to predict the dynamics and fate of evolving populations. However, a large body of empirical evidence collected over the last decades strongly suggests that some of the assumptions of those classical models necessitate a deep revision. The viability of organisms is not dependent on a unique and optimal genotype. The discovery of huge sets of genotypes (or neutral networks) yielding the same phenotype --in the last term the same organism--, reveals that, most likely, very different functional solutions can be found, accessed and fixed in a population through a low-cost exploration of the space of genomes. The evolution behind the curtain may be the answer to some of the current puzzles that evolutionary theory faces, like the fast speciation process that is observed in the fossil record after very long stasis periods.
One of the most direct human mechanisms of promoting cooperation is rewarding it. We study the effect of sharing a reward among cooperators in the most stringent form of social dilemma, namely the Prisoners Dilemma. Specifically, for a group of playe
rs that collect payoffs by playing a pairwise Prisoners Dilemma game with their partners, we consider an external entity that distributes a fixed reward equally among all cooperators. Thus, individuals confront a new dilemma: on the one hand, they may be inclined to choose the shared reward despite the possibility of being exploited by defectors; on the other hand, if too many players do that, cooperators will obtain a poor reward and defectors will outperform them. By appropriately tuning the amount to be shared a vast variety of scenarios arises, including traditional ones in the study of cooperation as well as more complex situations where unexpected behavior can occur. We provide a complete classification of the equilibria of the $n$-player game as well as of its evolutionary dynamics.
