Miners in a blockchain system are suffering from ever-increasing storage costs, which in general have not been properly compensated by the users transaction fees. This reduces the incentives for the miners participation and may jeopardize the blockch
ain security. We propose to mitigate this blockchain insufficient fee issue through a Fee and Waiting Tax (FWT) mechanism, which explicitly considers the two types of negative externalities in the system. Specifically, we model the interactions between the protocol designer, users, and miners as a three-stage Stackelberg game. By characterizing the equilibrium of the game, we find that miners neglecting the negative externality in transaction selection cause they are willing to accept insufficient-fee transactions. This leads to the insufficient storage fee issue in the existing protocol. Moreover, our proposed optimal FWT mechanism can motivate users to pay sufficient transaction fees to cover the storage costs and achieve the unconstrained social optimum. Numerical results show that the optimal FWT mechanism guarantees sufficient transaction fees and achieves an average social welfare improvement of 33.73% or more over the existing protocol. Furthermore, the optimal FWT mechanism achieves the maximum fairness index and performs well even under heterogeneous-storage-cost miners.
Existing risk-aware multi-armed bandit models typically focus on risk measures of individual options such as variance. As a result, they cannot be directly applied to important real-world online decision making problems with correlated options. In th
is paper, we propose a novel Continuous Mean-Covariance Bandit (CMCB) model to explicitly take into account option correlation. Specifically, in CMCB, there is a learner who sequentially chooses weight vectors on given options and observes random feedback according to the decisions. The agents objective is to achieve the best trade-off between reward and risk, measured with option covariance. To capture important reward observation scenarios in practice, we consider three feedback settings, i.e., full-information, semi-bandit and full-bandit feedback. We propose novel algorithms with the optimal regrets (within logarithmic factors), and provide matching lower bounds to validate their optimalities. Our experimental results also demonstrate the superiority of the proposed algorithms. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that considers option correlation in risk-aware bandits and explicitly quantifies how arbitrary covariance structures impact the learning performance.
A distributed machine learning platform needs to recruit many heterogeneous worker nodes to finish computation simultaneously. As a result, the overall performance may be degraded due to straggling workers. By introducing redundancy into computation,
coded machine learning can effectively improve the runtime performance by recovering the final computation result through the first $k$ (out of the total $n$) workers who finish computation. While existing studies focus on designing efficient coding schemes, the issue of designing proper incentives to encourage worker participation is still under-explored. This paper studies the platforms optimal incentive mechanism for motivating proper workers participation in coded machine learning, despite the incomplete information about heterogeneous workers computation performances and costs. A key contribution of this work is to summarize workers multi-dimensional heterogeneity as a one-dimensional metric, which guides the platforms efficient selection of workers under incomplete information with a linear computation complexity. Moreover, we prove that the optimal recovery threshold $k$ is linearly proportional to the participator number $n$ if we use the widely adopted MDS (Maximum Distance Separable) codes for data encoding. We also show that the platforms increased cost due to incomplete information disappears when worker number is sufficiently large, but it does not monotonically decrease in worker number.
Loyalty programs are important tools for sharing platforms seeking to grow supply. Online sharing platforms use loyalty programs to heavily subsidize resource providers, encouraging participation and boosting supply. As the sharing economy has evolve
d and competition has increased, the design of loyalty programs has begun to play a crucial role in the pursuit of maximal revenue. In this paper, we first characterize the optimal loyalty program for a platform with homogeneous users. We then show that optimal revenue in a heterogeneous market can be achieved by a class of multi-threshold loyalty program (MTLP) which admits a simple implementation-friendly structure. We also study the performance of loyalty programs in a setting with two competing sharing platforms, showing that the degree of heterogeneity is a crucial factor for both loyalty programs and pricing strategies. Our results show that sophisticated loyalty programs that reward suppliers via stepwise linear functions outperform simple sign-up bonuses, which give them a one time reward for participating.
Bike sharing provides an environment-friendly way for traveling and is booming all over the world. Yet, due to the high similarity of user travel patterns, the bike imbalance problem constantly occurs, especially for dockless bike sharing systems, ca
using significant impact on service quality and company revenue. Thus, it has become a critical task for bike sharing systems to resolve such imbalance efficiently. In this paper, we propose a novel deep reinforcement learning framework for incentivizing users to rebalance such systems. We model the problem as a Markov decision process and take both spatial and temporal features into consideration. We develop a novel deep reinforcement learning algorithm called Hierarchical Reinforcement Pricing (HRP), which builds upon the Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient algorithm. Different from existing methods that often ignore spatial information and rely heavily on accurate prediction, HRP captures both spatial and temporal dependencies using a divide-and-conquer structure with an embedded localized module. We conduct extensive experiments to evaluate HRP, based on a dataset from Mobike, a major Chinese dockless bike sharing company. Results show that HRP performs close to the 24-timeslot look-ahead optimization, and outperforms state-of-the-art methods in both service level and bike distribution. It also transfers well when applied to unseen areas.
In this paper, we investigate the effect of brand in market competition. Specifically, we propose a variant Hotelling model where companies and customers are represented by points in an Euclidean space, with axes being product features. $N$ companies
compete to maximize their own profits by optimally choosing their prices, while each customer in the market, when choosing sellers, considers the sum of product price, discrepancy between product feature and his preference, and a companys brand name, which is modeled by a function of its market area of the form $-betacdottext{(Market Area)}^q$, where $beta$ captures the brand influence and $q$ captures how market share affects the brand. By varying the parameters $beta$ and $q$, we derive existence results of Nash equilibrium and equilibrium market prices and shares. In particular, we prove that pure Nash equilibrium always exists when $q=0$ for markets with either one and two dominating features, and it always exists in a single dominating feature market when market affects brand name linearly, i.e., $q=1$. Moreover, we show that at equilibrium, a companys price is proportional to its market area over the competition intensity with its neighbors, a result that quantitatively reconciles the common belief of a companys pricing power. We also study an interesting wipe out phenomenon that only appears when $q>0$, which is similar to the undercut phenomenon in the Hotelling model, where companies may suddenly lose the entire market area with a small price increment. Our results offer novel insight into market pricing and positioning under competition with brand effect.
The growth of the sharing economy is driven by the emergence of sharing platforms, e.g., Uber and Lyft, that match owners looking to share their resources with customers looking to rent them. The design of such platforms is a complex mixture of econo
mics and engineering, and how to optimally design such platforms is still an open problem. In this paper, we focus on the design of prices and subsidies in sharing platforms. Our results provide insights into the tradeoff between revenue maximizing prices and social welfare maximizing prices. Specifically, we introduce a novel model of sharing platforms and characterize the profit and social welfare maximizing prices in this model. Further, we bound the efficiency loss under profit maximizing prices, showing that there is a strong alignment between profit and efficiency in practical settings. Our results highlight that the revenue of platforms may be limited in practice due to supply shortages; thus platforms have a strong incentive to encourage sharing via subsidies. We provide an analytic characterization of when such subsidies are valuable and show how to optimize the size of the subsidy provided. Finally, we validate the insights from our analysis using data from Didi Chuxing, the largest ridesharing platform in China.
