Electronic countermeasures (ECM) against a radar are actions taken by an adversarial jammer to mitigate effective utilization of the electromagnetic spectrum by the radar. On the other hand, electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) are actions taken
by the radar to mitigate the impact of electronic countermeasures (ECM) so that the radar can continue to operate effectively. The main idea of this paper is to show that ECCM involving a radar and a jammer can be formulated as a principal-agent problem (PAP) - a problem widely studied in microeconomics. With the radar as the principal and the jammer as the agent, we design a PAP to optimize the radars ECCM strategy in the presence of a jammer. The radar seeks to optimally trade-off signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the target measurement with the measurement cost: cost for generating radiation power for the pulse to probe the target. We show that for a suitable choice of utility functions, PAP is a convex optimization problem. Further, we analyze the structure of the PAP and provide sufficient conditions under which the optimal solution is an increasing function of the jamming power observed by the radar; this enables computation of the radars optimal ECCM within the class of increasing affine functions at a low computation cost. Finally, we illustrate the PAP formulation of the radars ECCM problem via numerical simulations. We also use simulations to study a radars ECCM problem wherein the radar and the jammer have mismatched information.
This paper studies controlling segregation in social networks via exogenous incentives. We construct an edge formation game on a directed graph. A user (node) chooses the probability with which it forms an inter- or intra- community edge based on a u
tility function that reflects the tradeoff between homophily (preference to connect with individuals that belong to the same group) and the preference to obtain an exogenous incentive. Decisions made by the users to connect with each other determine the evolution of the social network. We explore an algorithmic recommendation mechanism where the exogenous incentive in the utility function is based on weak ties which incentivizes users to connect across communities and mitigates the segregation. This setting leads to a submodular game with a unique Nash equilibrium. In numerical simulations, we explore how the proposed model can be useful in controlling segregation and echo chambers in social networks under various settings.
How can non-communicating agents learn to share congested resources efficiently? This is a challenging task when the agents can access the same resource simultaneously (in contrast to multi-agent multi-armed bandit problems) and the resource valuatio
ns differ among agents. We present a fully distributed algorithm for learning to share in congested environments and prove that the agents regret with respect to the optimal allocation is poly-logarithmic in the time horizon. Performance in the non-asymptotic regime is illustrated in numerical simulations. The distributed algorithm has applications in cloud computing and spectrum sharing. Keywords: Distributed learning, congestion games, poly-logarithmic regret.
Preferential attachment, homophily and, their consequences such as the glass ceiling effect have been well-studied in the context of undirected networks. However, the lack of an intuitive, theoretically tractable model of a directed, bi-populated~(i.
e.,~containing two groups) network with variable levels of preferential attachment, homophily and growth dynamics~(e.g.,~the rate at which new nodes join, whether the new nodes mostly follow existing nodes or the existing nodes follow them, etc.) has largely prevented such consequences from being explored in the context of directed networks, where they more naturally occur due to the asymmetry of links. To this end, we present a rigorous theoretical analysis of the emph{Directed Mixed Preferential Attachment} model and, use it to analyze the glass ceiling effect in directed networks. More specifically, we derive the closed-form expressions for the power-law exponents of the in- and out- degree distributions of each group~(minority and majority) and, compare them with each other to obtain insights. In particular, our results yield answers to questions such as: emph{when does the minority group have a heavier out-degree (or in-degree) distribution compared to the majority group? what effect does frequent addition of edges between existing nodes have on the in- and out- degree distributions of the majority and minority groups?}. Such insights shed light on the interplay between the structure~(i.e., the in- and out- degree distributions of the two groups) and dynamics~(characterized collectively by the homophily, preferential attachment, group sizes and growth dynamics) of various real-world networks. Finally, we utilize the obtained analytical results to characterize the conditions under which the glass ceiling effect emerge in a directed network. Our analytical results are supported by detailed numerical results.
Structural inequalities persist in society, conferring systematic advantages to some people at the expense of others, for example, by giving them substantially more influence and opportunities. Using bibliometric data about authors of scientific publ
ications, we identify two types of structural inequalities in scientific citations. First, female authors, who represent a minority of researchers, receive less recognition for their work (through citations) relative to male authors; second, authors affiliated with top-ranked institutions, who are also a minority, receive substantially more recognition compared to other authors. We present a model for the growth of directed citation networks and show that citations disparities arise from individual preferences to cite authors from the same group (homophily), highly cited or active authors (preferential attachment), as well as the size of the group and how frequently new authors join. We analyze the model and show that its predictions align well with real-world observations. Our theoretical and empirical analysis also suggests potential strategies to mitigate structural inequalities in science. In particular, we find that merely increasing the minority group size does little to narrow the disparities. Instead, reducing the homophily of each group, frequently adding new authors to a research field while providing them an accessible platform among existing, established authors, together with balanced group sizes can have the largest impact on reducing inequality. Our work highlights additional complexities of mitigating structural disparities stemming from asymmetric relations (e.g., directed citations) compared to symmetric relations (e.g., collaborations).
This paper considers policy search in continuous state-action reinforcement learning problems. Typically, one computes search directions using a classic expression for the policy gradient called the Policy Gradient Theorem, which decomposes the gradi
ent of the value function into two factors: the score function and the Q-function. This paper presents four results:(i) an alternative policy gradient theorem using weak (measure-valued) derivatives instead of score-function is established; (ii) the stochastic gradient estimates thus derived are shown to be unbiased and to yield algorithms that converge almost surely to stationary points of the non-convex value function of the reinforcement learning problem; (iii) the sample complexity of the algorithm is derived and is shown to be $O(1/sqrt(k))$; (iv) finally, the expected variance of the gradient estimates obtained using weak derivatives is shown to be lower than those obtained using the popular score-function approach. Experiments on OpenAI gym pendulum environment show superior performance of the proposed algorithm.
Consider a population of individuals that observe an underlying state of nature that evolves over time. The population is classified into different levels depending on the hierarchical influence that dictates how the individuals at each level form an
opinion on the state. The population is sampled sequentially by a pollster and the nodes (or individuals) respond to the questions asked by the pollster. This paper considers the following problem: How should the pollster poll the hierarchical social network to estimate the state while minimizing the polling cost (measurement cost and uncertainty in the Bayesian state estimate)? This paper proposes adaptiv
Consider a multi-agent network comprised of risk averse social sensors and a controller that jointly seek to estimate an unknown state of nature, given noisy measurements. The network of social sensors perform Bayesian social learning - each sensor f
uses the information revealed by previous social sensors along with its private valuation using Bayes rule - to optimize a local cost function. The controller sequentially modifies the cost function of the sensors by discriminatory pricing (control inputs) to realize long term global objectives. We formulate the stochastic control problem faced by the controller as a Partially Observed Markov Decision Process (POMDP) and derive structural results for the optimal control policy as a function of the risk-aversion factor in the Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) cost function of the sensors. We show that the optimal price sequence when the sensors are risk- averse is a super-martingale; i.e, it decreases on average over time.
This paper considers a multiple stopping time problem for a Markov chain observed in noise, where a decision maker chooses at most L stopping times to maximize a cumulative objective. We formulate the problem as a Partially Observed Markov Decision P
rocess (POMDP) and derive structural results for the optimal multiple stopping policy. The main results are as follows: i) The optimal multiple stopping policy is shown to be characterized by threshold curves in the unit simplex of Bayesian Posteriors. ii) The stopping setsl (defined by the threshold curves) are shown to exhibit a nested structure. iii) The optimal cumulative reward is shown to be monotone with respect to the copositive ordering of the transition matrix. iv) A stochastic gradient algorithm is provided for estimating linear threshold policies by exploiting the structural results. These linear threshold policies approximate the threshold curves, and share the monotone structure of the optimal multiple stopping policy. As an illustrative example, we apply the multiple stopping framework to interactively schedule advertisements in live online social media. It is shown that advertisement scheduling using multiple stopping performs significantly better than currently used methods.
A sequence of social sensors estimate an unknown parameter (modeled as a state of nature) by performing Bayesian Social Learning, and myopically optimize individual reward functions. The decisions of the social sensors contain quantized information a
bout the underlying state. How should a fusion center dynamically incentivize the social sensors for acquiring information about the underlying state? This paper presents five results. First, sufficient conditions on the model parameters are provided under which the optimal policy for the fusion center has a threshold structure. The optimal policy is determined in closed form, and is such that it switches between two exactly specified incentive policies at the threshold. Second, it is shown that the optimal incentive sequence is a sub-martingale, i.e, the optimal incentives increase on average over time. Third, it is shown that it is possible for the fusion center to learn the true state asymptotically by employing a sub-optimal policy; in other words, controlled information fusion with social sensors can be consistent. Fourth, uniform bounds on the average additional cost incurred by the fusion center for employing a sub-optimal policy are provided. This characterizes the trade-off between the cost of information acquisition and consistency for the fusion center. Finally, when it is sufficient to estimate the state with a degree of confidence, uniform bounds on the budget saved by employing policies that guarantee state estimation in finite time are provided.
