We propose a class of attacks on quantum key distribution (QKD) systems where an eavesdropper actively engineers new loopholes by using damaging laser illumination to permanently change properties of system components. This can turn a perfect QKD sys
tem into a completely insecure system. A proof-of-principle experiment performed on an avalanche photodiode-based detector shows that laser damage can be used to create loopholes. After about 1 W illumination, the detectors dark count rate reduces 2 to 5 times, permanently improving single-photon counting performance. After about 1.5 W, the detectors switch permanently into the linear photodetection mode and become completely insecure for QKD applications.
We report an automated characterization of a single-photon detector based on commercial silicon avalanche photodiode (PerkinElmer C30902SH). The photodiode is characterized by I-V curves at different illumination levels (darkness, 10 pW and 10 uW), d
ark count rate and photon detection efficiency at different bias voltages. The automated characterization routine is implemented in C++ running on a Linux computer.
We control using bright light an actively-quenched avalanche single-photon detector. Actively-quenched detectors are commonly used for quantum key distribution (QKD) in the visible and near-infrared range. This study shows that these detectors are co
ntrollable by the same attack used to hack passively-quenched and gated detectors. This demonstrates the generality of our attack and its possible applicability to eavsdropping the full secret key of all QKD systems using avalanche photodiodes (APDs). Moreover, the commercial detector model we tested (PerkinElmer SPCM-AQR) exhibits two new blinding mechanisms in addition to the previously observed thermal blinding of the APD, namely: malfunctioning of the bias voltage control circuit, and overload of the DC/DC converter biasing the APD. These two new technical loopholes found just in one detector model suggest that this problem must be solved in general, by incorporating generally imperfect detectors into the security proof for QKD.
We report operation and characterization of a lab-assembled single-photon detector based on commercial silicon avalanche photodiodes (PerkinElmer C30902SH, C30921SH). Dark count rate as low as 5 Hz was achieved by cooling the photodiodes down to -80
C. While afterpulsing increased as the photodiode temperature was decreased, total afterpulse probability did not become significant due to detectors relatively long deadtime in a passively-quenched scheme. We measured photon detection efficiency higher than 50% at 806 nm.
