Learning Noisy Hedonic Games

We consider the learning task of prediction of formation of core stable coalition structure in hedonic games based on agents noisy preferences. We have considered two cases: complete information (noisy preferences of all the agents are entirely known) and partial information (noisy preferences over some coalitions are only known). We introduce a noise model that probabilistically scales the valuations of coalitions. The performance metric is the probability of our prediction conditioned on all or few noisy preferences of the agents be correct. The nature of our results is that this prediction probability is relatively low, including being zero, and rarely it is one. In the complete information two-agent model, in which each agent `retains or `inflates the values of its coalitions, we identify the expressions of the prediction probabilities in terms of the noise probability. We identify the interval of the noise probability such that the prediction probability is at least a user-given threshold. It turned out that, for some noisy games, the noise probability interval does not exist for a threshold as low as 0.1481, thus demonstrating that the prediction probabilities are generally low even in this model. In the partial information setup, we consider $n$ agent games with $l$ support of noise values, and such noisy preferences are available for some coalitions only. We obtain the bounds on the prediction probability of a partition to be $epsilon$-PAC stable in the noise-free game in the cases when the realized noisy game has or hasnt $epsilon$-PAC stable outcome.

Multi-agent Natural Actor-critic Reinforcement Learning Algorithms

Both single-agent and multi-agent actor-critic algorithms are an important class of Reinforcement Learning algorithms. In this work, we propose three fully decentralized multi-agent natural actor-critic (MAN) algorithms. The agents objective is to collectively learn a joint policy that maximizes the sum of averaged long-term returns of these agents. In the absence of a central controller, agents communicate the information to their neighbors via a time-varying communication network while preserving privacy. We prove the convergence of all the 3 MAN algorithms to a globally asymptotically stable point of the ODE corresponding to the actor update; these use linear function approximations. We use the Fisher information matrix to obtain the natural gradients. The Fisher information matrix captures the curvature of the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between polices at successive iterates. We also show that the gradient of this KL divergence between policies of successive iterates is proportional to the objective functions gradient. Our MAN algorithms indeed use this emph{representation} of the objective functions gradient. Under certain conditions on the Fisher information matrix, we prove that at each iterate, the optimal value via MAN algorithms can be better than that of the multi-agent actor-critic (MAAC) algorithm using the standard gradients. To validate the usefulness of our proposed algorithms, we implement all the 3 MAN algorithms on a bi-lane traffic network to reduce the average network congestion. We observe an almost 25% reduction in the average congestion in 2 MAN algorithms; the average congestion in another MAN algorithm is on par with the MAAC algorithm. We also consider a generic 15 agent MARL; the performance of the MAN algorithms is again as good as the MAAC algorithm. We attribute the better performance of the MAN algorithms to their use of the above representation.

Interpretable feature subset selection: A Shapley value based approach

For feature selection and related problems, we introduce the notion of classification game, a cooperative game, with features as players and hinge loss based characteristic function and relate a features contribution to Shapley value based error apportioning (SVEA) of total training error. Our major contribution is ($star$) to show that for any dataset the threshold 0 on SVEA value identifies feature subset whose joint interactions for label prediction is significant or those features that span a subspace where the data is predominantly lying. In addition, our scheme ($star$) identifies the features on which Bayes classifier doesnt depend but any surrogate loss function based finite sample classifier does; this contributes to the excess $0$-$1$ risk of such a classifier, ($star$) estimates unknown true hinge risk of a feature, and ($star$) relate the stability property of an allocation and negative valued SVEA by designing the analogue of core of classification game. Due to Shapley values computationally expensive nature, we build on a known Monte Carlo based approximation algorithm that computes characteristic function (Linear Programs) only when needed. We address the potential sample bias problem in feature selection by providing interval estimates for SVEA values obtained from multiple sub-samples. We illustrate all the above aspects on various synthetic and real datasets and show that our scheme achieves better results than existing recursive feature elimination technique and ReliefF in most cases. Our theoretically grounded classification game in terms of well defined characteristic function offers interpretability (which we formalize in terms of final task) and explainability of our framework, including identification of important features.