Market-based instruments such as payments, auctions or tradable permits have been proposed as flexible and cost-effective instruments for biodiversity conservation on private lands. Trading the service of conservation requires one to define a metric
that determines the extent to which a conserved site adds to the regional conservation objective. Yet, while markets for conservation are widely discussed and increasingly applied, little research has been conducted on explicitly accounting for spatial ecological processes in the trading. In this paper, we use a coupled ecological economic simulation model to examine how spatial connectivity may be considered in the financial incentives created by a market-based conservation scheme. Land use decisions, driven by changing conservation costs and the conservation market, are simulated by an agent-based model of land users. On top of that, a metapopulation model evaluates the conservational success of the market. We find that optimal spatial incentives for agents correlate with species characteristics such as the dispersal distance, but they also depend on the spatio-temporal distribution of conservation costs. We conclude that a combined analysis of ecological and socio-economic conditions should be applied when designing market instruments to protect biodiversity.
Market-based conservation instruments, such as payments, auctions or tradable permits, are environmental policies that create financial incentives for landowners to engage in voluntary conservation on their land. But what if ecological processes oper
ate across property boundaries and land use decisions on one property influence ecosystem functions on neighboring sites? This paper examines how to account for such spatial externalities when designing market-based conservation instruments. We use an agent-based model to analyze different spatial metrics and their implications on land use decisions in a dynamic cost environment. The model contains a number of alternative submodels which differ in incentive design and social interactions of agents, the latter including coordinating as well as cooperating behavior of agents. We find that incentive design and social interactions have a strong influence on the spatial allocation and the costs of the conservation market.
EcoTRADE is a multi player network game of a virtual biodiversity credit market. Each player controls the land use of a certain amount of parcels on a virtual landscape. The biodiversity credits of a particular parcel depend on neighboring parcels, w
hich may be owned by other players. The game can be used to study the strategies of players in experiments or classroom games and also as a communication tool for stakeholders participating in credit markets that include spatially interdependent credits.
Survival probability within a certain time horizon T is a common measure of population viability. The choice of T implicitly involves a time preference, similar to economic discounting: Conservation success is evaluated at the time horizon T, while a
ll effects that occur later than T are not considered. Despite the obvious relevance of the time horizon, ecological studies seldom analyze its impact on the evaluation of conservation options. In this paper, we show that, while the choice of T does not change the ranking of conservation options for single species under stationary conditions, it may substantially change conservation decisions for multiple species. We conclude that it is of crucial importance to investigate the sensitivity of model results to the choice of the time horizon or other measures of time preference when prioritizing biodiversity conservation efforts.
