اشترك بالحزمة الذهبية واحصل على وصول غير محدود شمرا أكاديميا
تسجيل مستخدم جديدEcoTRADE - a multi player network game of a tradable permit market for biodiversity credits
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EcoTRADE is a multi player network game of a virtual biodiversity credit market. Each player controls the land use of a certain amount of parcels on a virtual landscape. The biodiversity credits of a particular parcel depend on neighboring parcels, which may be owned by other players. The game can be used to study the strategies of players in experiments or classroom games and also as a communication tool for stakeholders participating in credit markets that include spatially interdependent credits.
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