Miners in a blockchain system are suffering from ever-increasing storage costs, which in general have not been properly compensated by the users transaction fees. This reduces the incentives for the miners participation and may jeopardize the blockch
ain security. We propose to mitigate this blockchain insufficient fee issue through a Fee and Waiting Tax (FWT) mechanism, which explicitly considers the two types of negative externalities in the system. Specifically, we model the interactions between the protocol designer, users, and miners as a three-stage Stackelberg game. By characterizing the equilibrium of the game, we find that miners neglecting the negative externality in transaction selection cause they are willing to accept insufficient-fee transactions. This leads to the insufficient storage fee issue in the existing protocol. Moreover, our proposed optimal FWT mechanism can motivate users to pay sufficient transaction fees to cover the storage costs and achieve the unconstrained social optimum. Numerical results show that the optimal FWT mechanism guarantees sufficient transaction fees and achieves an average social welfare improvement of 33.73% or more over the existing protocol. Furthermore, the optimal FWT mechanism achieves the maximum fairness index and performs well even under heterogeneous-storage-cost miners.
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) can enhance the performance of cellular networks, due to their high mobility and efficient deployment. In this paper, we present a first study on how the user mobility affects the UAVs trajectories of a multiple-UAV as
sisted wireless communication system. Specifically, we consider the UAVs are deployed as aerial base stations to serve ground users who move between different regions. We maximize the throughput of ground users in the downlink communication by optimizing the UAVs trajectories, while taking into account the impact of the user mobility, propulsion energy consumption, and UAVs mutual interference. We formulate the problem as a route selection problem in an acyclic directed graph. Each vertex represents a task associated with a reward on the average user throughput in a region-time point, while each edge is associated with a cost on the energy propulsion consumption during flying and hovering. For the centralized trajectory design, we first propose the shortest path scheme that determines the optimal trajectory for the single UAV case. We also propose the centralized route selection (CRS) scheme to systematically compute the optimal trajectories for the more general multiple-UAV case. Due to the NP-hardness of the centralized problem, we consider the distributed trajectory design that each UAV selects its trajectory autonomously and propose the distributed route selection (DRS) scheme, which will converge to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium within a finite number of iterations.
