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Register a new userThrees!, Fives, 1024!, and 2048 are Hard
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Added by
Yushi Uno
Publication date
2015
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
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We analyze the computational complexity of the popular computer games Threes!, 1024!, 2048 and many of their variants. For most kno
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The random k-SAT model is the most important and well-studied distribution over k-SAT instances. It is closely connected to statistical physics; it is used as a testbench for satisfiability algorithms, and average-case hardness over this distribution has also been linked to hardness of approximation via Feiges hypothesis. We prove that any Cutting Planes refutation for random k-SAT requires exponential size, for k that is logarithmic in the number of variables, in the (interesting) regime where the number of clauses guarantees that the formula is unsatisfiable with high probability.
Assuming that the Permanent polynomial requires algebraic circuits of exponential size, we show that the class VNP does not have efficiently computable equations. In other words, any nonzero polynomial that vanishes on the coefficient vectors of all polynomials in the class VNP requires algebraic circuits of super-polynomial size. In a recent work of Chatterjee and the authors (FOCS 2020), it was shown that the subclasses of VP and VNP consisting of polynomials with bounded integer coefficients do have equations with small algebraic circuits. Their work left open the possibility that these results could perhaps be extended to all of VP or VNP. The results in this paper show that assuming the hardness of Permanent, at least for VNP, allowing polynomials with large coefficients does indeed incur a significant blow up in the circuit complexity of equations.
This paper has been withdrawn by the author due to errors.
We show that the BIMATRIX game does not have a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme, unless PPAD is in P. In other words, no algorithm with time polynomial in n and 1/epsilon can compute an epsilon-approximate Nash equilibrium of an n by nbimatrix game, unless PPAD is in P. Instrumental to our proof, we introduce a new discrete fixed-point problem on a high-dimensional cube with a constant side-length, such as on an n-dimensional cube with side-length 7, and show that they are PPAD-complete. Furthermore, we prove, unless PPAD is in RP, that the smoothed complexity of the Lemke-Howson algorithm or any algorithm for computing a Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game is polynomial in n and 1/sigma under perturbations with magnitude sigma. Our result answers a major open question in the smoothed analysis of algorithms and the approximation of Nash equilibria.
The use of monotonicity and Tarskis theorem in existence proofs of equilibria is very widespread in economics, while Tarskis theorem is also often used for similar purposes in the context of verification. However, there has been relatively little in the way of analysis of the complexity of finding the fixed points and equilibria guaranteed by this result. We study a computational formalism based on monotone functions on the $d$-dimensional grid with sides of length $N$, and their fixed points, as well as the closely connected subject of supermodular games and their equilibria. It is known that finding some (any) fixed point of a monotone function can be done in time $log^d N$, and we show it requires at least $log^2 N$ function evaluations already on the 2-dimensional grid, even for randomized algorithms. We show that the general Tarski problem of finding some fixed point, when the monotone function is given succinctly (by a boolean circuit), is in the class PLS of problems solvable by local search and, rather surprisingly, also in the class PPAD. Finding the greatest or least fixed point guaranteed by Tarskis theorem, however, requires $dcdot N$ steps, and is NP-hard in the white box model. For supermodular games, we show that finding an equilibrium in such games is essentially computationally equivalent to the Tarski problem, and finding the maximum or minimum equilibrium is similarly harder. Interestingly, two-player supermodular games where the strategy space of one player is one-dimensional can be solved in $O(log N)$ steps. We also observe that computing (approximating) the value of Condons (Shapleys) stochastic games reduces to the Tarski problem. An important open problem highlighted by this work is proving a $Omega(log^d N)$ lower bound for small fixed dimension $d geq 3$.
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