No Arabic abstract
In this thesis we study the finite-size analysis of two continuous-variables quantum key distribution schemes. The first one is the one-way protocol using Gaussian modulation of thermal states and the other is the measurement-device-independent protocol. To do so, we adopt an efficient channel parameter estimation method based on the assumption of the Gaussian variables and the central limit theorem introduced by Ruppert et al. [Phys. Rev. A 90, 062310 (2014)]. Furthermore, we present a composable security analysis of the measurement device independent protocol for coherent attacks with a channel parameter estimation that is not based on the central limit theorem. We also investigated, in the asymptotic regime, an asymmetric situation for the authenticated parties against the eavesdropper caused by fast-fading channels. Here we assume that the eavesdropper has the full control of the communication channel and can instantaneously change its transmissivity in every use of it. We assumed the simple model of a uniform fading and addressed the cases of one-way protocols, continuous-measurement device-independent protocol in symmetric configuration and its star network extension for three users. Finally, we extended the asymptotic study of the one-way protocols using an arbitrary number of phase-encoded coherent states assuming a thermal loss channel without using a Gaussian approximation.
We study the impact of finite-size effects on the key rate of continuous-variable (CV) measurement-device-independent (MDI) quantum key distribution (QKD). Inspired by the parameter estimation technique developed in [Rupert textit{et al.} Phys. Rev. A textbf{90}, 062310 (2014)]~we adapt it to study CV-MDI-QKD and, assuming realistic experimental conditions, we analyze the impact of finite-size effects on the key rate. We find that, increasing the block-size, the performance of the protocol converges towards the ideal one, and that block-sizes between $10^{6}$ and $10^{9}$ data points can already provide a key rate $sim10^{-2}$ bit/use over metropolitan distances.
A practical quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol necessarily runs in finite time and, hence, only a finite amount of communication is exchanged. This is in contrast to most of the standard results on the security of QKD, which only hold in the limit where the number of transmitted signals approaches infinity. Here, we analyze the security of QKD under the realistic assumption that the amount of communication is finite. At the level of the general formalism, we present new results that help simplifying the actual implementation of QKD protocols: in particular, we show that symmetrization steps, which are required by certain security proofs (e.g., proofs based on de Finettis representation theorem), can be omitted in practical implementations. Also, we demonstrate how two-way reconciliation protocols can be taken into account in the security analysis. At the level of numerical estimates, we present the bounds with finite resources for ``device-independent security against collective attacks.
In comparison to conventional discrete-variable (DV) quantum key distribution (QKD), continuous-variable (CV) QKD with homodyne/heterodyne measurements has distinct advantages of lower-cost implementation and affinity to wavelength division multiplexing. On the other hand, its continuous nature makes it harder to accommodate to practical signal processing, which is always discretized, leading to lack of complete security proofs so far. Here we propose a tight and robust method of estimating fidelity of an optical pulse to a coherent state via heterodyne measurements. We then construct a binary phase modulated CV QKD protocol and prove its security in the finite-key-size regime against general coherent attacks, based on proof techniques of DV QKD. Such a complete security proof achieves a significant milestone in exploiting the benefits of CV QKD.
We study the impact of finite-size effects on the security of thermal one-way quantum cryptography. Our approach considers coherent/squeezed states at the preparation stage, on the top of which the sender adds trusted thermal noise. We compute the key rate incorporating finite-size effects, and we obtain the security threshold at different frequencies. As expected finite-size effects deteriorate the performance of thermal quantum cryptography. Our analysis is useful to quantify the impact of this degradation on relevant parameters like tolerable attenuation, transmission frequencies at which one can achieve security.
We consider continuous-variable quantum key distribution with discrete-alphabet encodings. In particular, we study protocols where information is encoded in the phase of displaced coherent (or thermal) states, even though the results can be directly extended to any protocol based on finite constellations of displaced Gaussian states. In this setting, we provide a composable security analysis in the finite-size regime assuming the realistic but restrictive hypothesis of collective Gaussian attacks. Under this assumption, we can efficiently estimate the parameters of the channel via maximum likelihood estimators and bound the corresponding error in the final secret key rate.