No Arabic abstract
In this paper, we study a class of generalized monotone variational inequality (GMVI) problems whose operators are not necessarily monotone (e.g., pseudo-monotone). We present non-Euclidean extragradient (N-EG) methods for computing approximate strong solutions of these problems, and demonstrate how their iteration complexities depend on the global Lipschitz or H{o}lder continuity properties for their operators and the smoothness properties for the distance generating function used in the N-EG algorithms. We also introduce a variant of this algorithm by incorporating a simple line-search procedure to deal with problems with more general continuous operators. Numerical studies are conducted to illustrate the significant advantages of the developed algorithms over the existing ones for solving large-scale GMVI problems.
The optimization problems associated with training generative adversarial neural networks can be largely reduced to certain {em non-monotone} variational inequality problems (VIPs), whereas existing convergence results are mostly based on monotone or strongly monotone assumptions. In this paper, we propose {em optimistic dual extrapolation (OptDE)}, a method that only performs {em one} gradient evaluation per iteration. We show that OptDE is provably convergent to {em a strong solution} under different coherent non-monotone assumptions. In particular, when a {em weak solution} exists, the convergence rate of our method is $O(1/{epsilon^{2}})$, which matches the best existing result of the methods with two gradient evaluations. Further, when a {em $sigma$-weak solution} exists, the convergence guarantee is improved to the linear rate $O(logfrac{1}{epsilon})$. Along the way--as a byproduct of our inquiries into non-monotone variational inequalities--we provide the near-optimal $Obig(frac{1}{epsilon}log frac{1}{epsilon}big)$ convergence guarantee in terms of restricted strong merit function for monotone variational inequalities. We also show how our results can be naturally generalized to the stochastic setting, and obtain corresponding new convergence results. Taken together, our results contribute to the broad landscape of variational inequality--both non-monotone and monotone alike--by providing a novel and more practical algorithm with the state-of-the-art convergence guarantees.
In infinite-dimensional Hilbert spaces we device a class of strongly convergent primal-dual schemes for solving variational inequalities defined by a Lipschitz continuous and pseudomonote map. Our novel numerical scheme is based on Tsengs forward-backward-forward scheme, which is known to display weak convergence, unless very strong global monotonicity assumptions are made on the involved operators. We provide a simple augmentation of this algorithm which is computationally cheap and still guarantees strong convergence to a minimal norm solution of the underlying problem. We provide an adaptive extension of the algorithm, freeing us from requiring knowledge of the global Lipschitz constant. We test the performance of the algorithm in the computationally challenging task to find dynamic user equilibria in traffic networks and verify that our scheme is at least competitive to state-of-the-art solvers, and in some case even improve upon them.
We provide improved convergence rates for constrained convex-concave min-max problems and monotone variational inequalities with higher-order smoothness. In min-max settings where the $p^{th}$-order derivatives are Lipschitz continuous, we give an algorithm HigherOrderMirrorProx that achieves an iteration complexity of $O(1/T^{frac{p+1}{2}})$ when given access to an oracle for finding a fixed point of a $p^{th}$-order equation. We give analogous rates for the weak monotone variational inequality problem. For $p>2$, our results improve upon the iteration complexity of the first-order Mirror Prox method of Nemirovski [2004] and the second-order method of Monteiro and Svaiter [2012]. We further instantiate our entire algorithm in the unconstrained $p=2$ case.
We study the stochastic bilinear minimax optimization problem, presenting an analysis of the Stochastic ExtraGradient (SEG) method with constant step size, and presenting variations of the method that yield favorable convergence. We first note that the last iterate of the basic SEG method only contracts to a fixed neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium, independent of the step size. This contrasts sharply with the standard setting of minimization where standard stochastic algorithms converge to a neighborhood that vanishes in proportion to the square-root (constant) step size. Under the same setting, however, we prove that when augmented with iteration averaging, SEG provably converges to the Nash equilibrium, and such a rate is provably accelerated by incorporating a scheduled restarting procedure. In the interpolation setting, we achieve an optimal convergence rate up to tight constants. We present numerical experiments that validate our theoretical findings and demonstrate the effectiveness of the SEG method when equipped with iteration averaging and restarting.
This paper investigates the problem of computing the equilibrium of competitive games, which is often modeled as a constrained saddle-point optimization problem with probability simplex constraints. Despite recent efforts in understanding the last-iterate convergence of extragradient methods in the unconstrained setting, the theoretical underpinnings of these methods in the constrained settings, especially those using multiplicative updates, remain highly inadequate, even when the objective function is bilinear. Motivated by the algorithmic role of entropy regularization in single-agent reinforcement learning and game theory, we develop provably efficient extragradient methods to find the quantal response equilibrium (QRE) -- which are solutions to zero-sum two-player matrix games with entropy regularization -- at a linear rate. The proposed algorithms can be implemented in a decentralized manner, where each player executes symmetric and multiplicative updates iteratively using its own payoff without observing the opponents actions directly. In addition, by controlling the knob of entropy regularization, the proposed algorithms can locate an approximate Nash equilibrium of the unregularized matrix game at a sublinear rate without assuming the Nash equilibrium to be unique. Our methods also lead to efficient policy extragradient algorithms for solving entropy-regularized zero-sum Markov games at a linear rate. All of our convergence rates are nearly dimension-free, which are independent of the size of the state and action spaces up to logarithm factors, highlighting the positive role of entropy regularization for accelerating convergence.