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Register a new userThe Confluence of Networks, Games and Learning
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Added by
Tao Li
Publication date
2021
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
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Recent years have witnessed significant advances in technologies and services in modern network applications, including smart grid management, wireless communication, cybersecurity as well as multi-agent autonomous systems. Considering the heterogeneous nature of networked entities, emerging network applications call for game-theoretic models and learning-based approaches in order to create distributed network intelligence that responds to uncertainties and disruptions in a dynamic or an adversarial environment. This paper articulates the confluence of networks, games and learning, which establishes a theoretical underpinning for understanding multi-agent decision-making over networks. We provide an selective overview of game-theoretic learning algorithms within the framework of stochastic approximation theory, and associated applications in some representative contexts of modern network systems, such as the next generation wireless communication networks, the smart grid and distributed machine learning. In addition to existing research works on game-theoretic learning over networks, we highlight several new angles and research endeavors on learning in games that are related to recent developments in artificial intelligence. Some of the new angles extrapolate from our own research interests. The overall objective of the paper is to provide the reader a clear picture of the strengths and challenges of adopting game-theoretic learning methods within the context of network systems, and further to identify fruitful future research directions on both theoretical and applied studies.
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The collaboration between agents has gradually become an important topic in multi-agent systems. The key is how to efficiently solve the credit assignment problems. This paper introduces MGAN for collaborative multi-agent reinforcement learning, a new algorithm that combines graph convolutional networks and value-decomposition methods. MGAN learns the representation of agents from different perspectives through multiple graph networks, and realizes the proper allocation of attention between all agents. We show the amazing ability of the graph network in representation learning by visualizing the output of the graph network, and therefore improve interpretability for the actions of each agent in the multi-agent system.
Measuring and promoting policy diversity is critical for solving games with strong non-transitive dynamics where strategic cycles exist, and there is no consistent winner (e.g., Rock-Paper-Scissors). With that in mind, maintaining a pool of diverse policies via open-ended learning is an attractive solution, which can generate auto-curricula to avoid being exploited. However, in conventional open-ended learning algorithms, there are no widely accepted definitions for diversity, making it hard to construct and evaluate the diverse policies. In this work, we summarize previous concepts of diversity and work towards offering a unified measure of diversity in multi-agent open-ended learning to include all elements in Markov games, based on both Behavioral Diversity (BD) and Response Diversity (RD). At the trajectory distribution level, we re-define BD in the state-action space as the discrepancies of occupancy measures. For the reward dynamics, we propose RD to characterize diversity through the responses of policies when encountering different opponents. We also show that many current diversity measures fall in one of the categories of BD or RD but not both. With this unified diversity measure, we design the corresponding diversity-promoting objective and population effectivity when seeking the best responses in open-ended learning. We validate our methods in both relatively simple games like matrix game, non-transitive mixture model, and the complex textit{Google Research Football} environment. The population found by our methods reveals the lowest exploitability, highest population effectivity in matrix game and non-transitive mixture model, as well as the largest goal difference when interacting with opponents of various levels in textit{Google Research Football}.
We propose a curriculum-driven learning strategy for solving difficult multi-agent coordination tasks. Our method is inspired by a study of animal communication, which shows that two straightforward design features (mutual reward and decentralization) support a vast spectrum of communication protocols in nature. We highlight the importance of similarly interpreting emergent communication as a spectrum. We introduce a toroidal, continuous-space pursuit-evasion environment and show that naive decentralized learning does not perform well. We then propose a novel curriculum-driven strategy for multi-agent learning. Experiments with pursuit-evasion show that our approach enables decentralized pursuers to learn to coordinate and capture a superior evader, significantly outperforming sophisticated analytical policies. We argue through additional quantitative analysis -- including influence-based measures such as Instantaneous Coordination -- that emergent implicit communication plays a large role in enabling superior levels of coordination.
We present an approach for implementing a specific form of collaborative industrial practices-called Industrial Symbiotic Networks (ISNs)-as MC-Net cooperative games and address the so called ISN implementation problem. This is, the characteristics of ISNs may lead to inapplicability of fair and stable benefit allocation methods even if the collaboration is a collectively desired one. Inspired by realistic ISN scenarios and the literature on normative multi-agent systems, we consider regulations and normative socioeconomic policies as two elements that in combination with ISN games resolve the situation and result in the concept of coordinated ISNs.
It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games that a player has an incentive to adopt, that would be evolutionary stable or that could learn itself. Rather, a player has an incentive to strategically teach such a learning opponent in order secure at least the Stackelberg leader payoff. The impossibility result remains intact when restricted to the classes of generic games, two-player games, potential games, games with strategic complements or 2x2 games, in which learning is known to be nice. More generally, it also applies to uncoupled learning heuristics leading to correlated equilibria, rationalizable outcomes, iterated admissible outcomes, or minimal curb sets. A possibility result restricted to strategically trivial games fails if some generic games outside this class are considered as well.
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