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Register a new userIndustrial Symbiotic Networks as Coordinated Games
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Added by
Vahid Yazdanpanah
Publication date
2018
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
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We present an approach for implementing a specific form of collaborative industrial practices-called Industrial Symbiotic Networks (ISNs)-as MC-Net cooperative games and address the so called ISN implementation problem. This is, the characteristics of ISNs may lead to inapplicability of fair and stable benefit allocation methods even if the collaboration is a collectively desired one. Inspired by realistic ISN scenarios and the literature on normative multi-agent systems, we consider regulations and normative socioeconomic policies as two elements that in combination with ISN games resolve the situation and result in the concept of coordinated ISNs.
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