No Arabic abstract
Centralized monetary policy, leading to persistent inflation, is often inconsistent, untrustworthy, and unpredictable. Algorithmic stable coins enabled by blockchain technology are promising in solving this problem. Algorithmic stable coins utilize a monetary policy that is entirely rule-based. However, there is little understanding about how to optimize the rule. We propose a model that trade-offs between the price and supply stability. We further study the comparative statistics by varying several design features. Finally, we discuss the empirical implications and further research for industry applications.
We investigate an optimal investment-consumption and optimal level of insurance on durable consumption goods with a positive loading in a continuous-time economy. We assume that the economic agent invests in the financial market and in durable as well as perishable consumption goods to derive utilities from consumption over time in a jump-diffusion market. Assuming that the financial assets and durable consumption goods can be traded without transaction costs, we provide a semi-explicit solution for the optimal insurance coverage for durable goods and financial asset. With transaction costs for trading the durable good proportional to the total value of the durable good, we formulate the agents optimization problem as a combined stochastic and impulse control problem, with an implicit intervention value function. We solve this problem numerically using stopping time iteration, and analyze the numerical results using illustrative examples.
There is by now a large consensus in modern monetary policy. This consensus has been built upon a dynamic general equilibrium model of optimal monetary policy as developed by, e.g., Goodfriend and King (1997), Clarida et al. (1999), Svensson (1999) and Woodford (2003). In this paper we extend the standard optimal monetary policy model by introducing nonlinearity into the Phillips curve. Under the specific form of nonlinearity proposed in our paper (which allows for convexity and concavity and secures closed form solutions), we show that the introduction of a nonlinear Phillips curve into the structure of the standard model in a discrete time and deterministic framework produces radical changes to the major conclusions regarding stability and the efficiency of monetary policy. We emphasize the following main results: (i) instead of a unique fixed point we end up with multiple equilibria; (ii) instead of saddle--path stability, for different sets of parameter values we may have saddle stability, totally unstable equilibria and chaotic attractors; (iii) for certain degrees of convexity and/or concavity of the Phillips curve, where endogenous fluctuations arise, one is able to encounter various results that seem intuitively correct. Firstly, when the Central Bank pays attention essentially to inflation targeting, the inflation rate has a lower mean and is less volatile; secondly, when the degree of price stickiness is high, the inflation rate displays a larger mean and higher volatility (but this is sensitive to the values given to the parameters of the model); and thirdly, the higher the target value of the output gap chosen by the Central Bank, the higher is the inflation rate and its volatility.
Background: A major question in Covid-19 research is whether democracies handled the Covid-19 pandemic crisis better or worse than authoritarian countries. However, it is important to consider the issues of democracy versus authoritarianism, and state fragility, when examining official Covid-19 death counts in research, because these factors can influence the accurate reporting of pandemic deaths by governments. In contrast, excess deaths are less prone to variability in differences in definitions of Covid-19 deaths and testing capacities across countries. Here we use excess pandemic deaths to explore potential relationships between political systems and public health outcomes. Methods: We address these issues by comparing the official government Covid-19 death counts in a well-established John Hopkins database to the generally more reliable excess mortality measure of Covid-19 deaths, taken from the recently released World Mortality Dataset. We put the comparison in the context of the political and fragile state dimensions. Findings: We find (1) significant potential underreporting of Covid-19 deaths by authoritarian governments and governments with high state fragility and (2) substantial geographic variation among countries and regions with regard to standard democracy indices. Additionally, we find that more authoritarian governments are (weakly) associated with more excess deaths during the pandemic than democratic governments. Interpretations: The inhibition and censorship of information flows, inherent to authoritarian states, likely results in major inaccuracies in pandemic statistics that confound global public health analyses. Thus, both excess pandemic deaths and official Covid-19 death counts should be examined in studies using death as an outcome variable.
AI and reinforcement learning (RL) have improved many areas, but are not yet widely adopted in economic policy design, mechanism design, or economics at large. At the same time, current economic methodology is limited by a lack of counterfactual data, simplistic behavioral models, and limited opportunities to experiment with policies and evaluate behavioral responses. Here we show that machine-learning-based economic simulation is a powerful policy and mechanism design framework to overcome these limitations. The AI Economist is a two-level, deep RL framework that trains both agents and a social planner who co-adapt, providing a tractable solution to the highly unstable and novel two-level RL challenge. From a simple specification of an economy, we learn rational agent behaviors that adapt to learned planner policies and vice versa. We demonstrate the efficacy of the AI Economist on the problem of optimal taxation. In simple one-step economies, the AI Economist recovers the optimal tax policy of economic theory. In complex, dynamic economies, the AI Economist substantially improves both utilitarian social welfare and the trade-off between equality and productivity over baselines. It does so despite emergent tax-gaming strategies, while accounting for agent interactions and behavioral change more accurately than economic theory. These results demonstrate for the first time that two-level, deep RL can be used for understanding and as a complement to theory for economic design, unlocking a new computational learning-based approach to understanding economic policy.
In this paper, we study general monetary risk measures (without any convexity or weak convexity). A monetary (respectively, positively homogeneous) risk measure can be characterized as the lower envelope of a family of convex (respectively, coherent) risk measures. The proof does not depend on but easily leads to the classical representation theorems for convex and coherent risk measures. When the law-invariance and the SSD (second-order stochastic dominance)-consistency are involved, it is not the convexity (respectively, coherence) but the comonotonic convexity (respectively, comonotonic coherence) of risk measures that can be used for such kind of lower envelope characterizations in a unified form. The representation of a law-invariant risk measure in terms of VaR is provided.