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Register a new userImproved Cooperation by Exploiting a Common Signal
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Added by
Panayiotis Danassis
Publication date
2021
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
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Can artificial agents benefit from human conventions? Human societies manage to successfully self-organize and resolve the tragedy of the commons in common-pool resources, in spite of the bleak prediction of non-cooperative game theory. On top of that, real-world problems are inherently large-scale and of low observability. One key concept that facilitates human coordination in such settings is the use of conventions. Inspired by human behavior, we investigate the learning dynamics and emergence of temporal conventions, focusing on common-pool resources. Extra emphasis was given in designing a realistic evaluation setting: (a) environment dynamics are modeled on real-world fisheries, (b) we assume decentralized learning, where agents can observe only their own history, and (c) we run large-scale simulations (up to 64 agents). Uncoupled policies and low observability make cooperation hard to achieve; as the number of agents grow, the probability of taking a correct gradient direction decreases exponentially. By introducing an arbitrary common signal (e.g., date, time, or any periodic set of numbers) as a means to couple the learning process, we show that temporal conventions can emerge and agents reach sustainable harvesting strategies. The introduction of the signal consistently improves the social welfare (by 258% on average, up to 3306%), the range of environmental parameters where sustainability can be achieved (by 46% on average, up to 300%), and the convergence speed in low abundance settings (by 13% on average, up to 53%).
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In many real-world problems, a team of agents need to collaborate to maximize the common reward. Although existing works formulate this problem into a centralized learning with decentralized execution framework, which avoids the non-stationary problem in training, their decentralized execution paradigm limits the agents capability to coordinate. Inspired by the concept of correlated equilibrium, we propose to introduce a coordination signal to address this limitation, and theoretically show that following mild conditions, decentralized agents with the coordination signal can coordinate their individual policies as manipulated by a centralized controller. The idea of introducing coordination signal is to encapsulate coordinated strategies into the signals, and use the signals to instruct the collaboration in decentralized execution. To encourage agents to learn to exploit the coordination signal, we propose Signal Instructed Coordination (SIC), a novel coordination module that can be integrated with most existing MARL frameworks. SIC casts a common signal sampled from a pre-defined distribution to all agents, and introduces an information-theoretic regularization to facilitate the consistency between the observed signal and agents policies. Our experiments show that SIC consistently improves performance over well-recognized MARL models in both matrix games and a predator-prey game with high-dimensional strategy space.
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