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Register a new userA Novel Graphical Lasso based approach towards Segmentation Analysis in Energy Game-Theoretic Frameworks
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Energy game-theoretic frameworks have emerged to be a successful strategy to encourage energy efficient behavior in large scale by leveraging human-in-the-loop strategy. A number of such frameworks have been introduced over the years which formulate the energy saving process as a competitive game with appropriate incentives for energy efficient players. However, prior works involve an incentive design mechanism which is dependent on knowledge of utility functions for all the players in the game, which is hard to compute especially when the number of players is high, common in energy game-theoretic frameworks. Our research proposes that the utilities of players in such a framework can be grouped together to a relatively small number of clusters, and the clusters can then be targeted with tailored incentives. The key to above segmentation analysis is to learn the features leading to human decision making towards energy usage in competitive environments. We propose a novel graphical lasso based approach to perform such segmentation, by studying the feature correlations in a real-world energy social game dataset. To further improve the explainability of the model, we perform causality study using grangers causality. Proposed segmentation analysis results in characteristic clusters demonstrating different energy usage behaviors. We also present avenues to implement intelligent incentive design using proposed segmentation method.
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In this paper, we propose a gamification approach as a novel framework for smart building infrastructure with the goal of motivating human occupants to reconsider personal energy usage and to have positive effects on their environment. Human interaction in the context of cyber-physical systems is a core component and consideration in the implementation of any smart building technology. Research has shown that the adoption of human-centric building services and amenities leads to improvements in the operational efficiency of these cyber-physical systems directed towards controlling building energy usage. We introduce a strategy in form of a game-theoretic framework that incorporates humans-in-the-loop modeling by creating an interface to allow building managers to interact with occupants and potentially incentivize energy efficient behavior. Prior works on game theoretic analysis typically rely on the assumption that the utility function of each individual agent is known a priori. Instead, we propose novel utility learning framework for benchmarking that employs robust estimations of occupant actions towards energy efficiency. To improve forecasting performance, we extend the utility learning scheme by leveraging deep bi-directional recurrent neural networks. Using the proposed methods on data gathered from occupant actions for resources such as room lighting, we forecast patterns of energy resource usage to demonstrate the prediction performance of the methods. The results of our study show that we can achieve a highly accurate representation of the ground truth for occupant energy resource usage. We also demonstrate the explainable nature on human decision making towards energy usage inherent in the dataset using graphical lasso and granger causality algorithms. Finally, we open source the de-identified, high-dimensional data pertaining to the energy game-theoretic framework.
A generalized gamification framework is introduced as a form of smart infrastructure with potential to improve sustainability and energy efficiency by leveraging humans-in-the-loop strategy. The proposed framework enables a Human-Centric Cyber-Physical System using an interface to allow building managers to interact with occupants. The interface is designed for occupant engagement-integration supporting learning of their preferences over resources in addition to understanding how preferences change as a function of external stimuli such as physical control, time or incentives. Towards intelligent and autonomous incentive design, a noble statistical learning algorithm performing occupants energy usage behavior segmentation is proposed. We apply the proposed algorithm, Graphical Lasso, on energy resource usage data by the occupants to obtain feature correlations--dependencies. Segmentation analysis results in characteristic clusters demonstrating different energy usage behaviors. The features--factors characterizing human decision-making are made explainable.
Research in adversarial learning follows a cat and mouse game between attackers and defenders where attacks are proposed, they are mitigated by new defenses, and subsequently new attacks are proposed that break earlier defenses, and so on. However, it has remained unclear as to whether there are conditions under which no better attacks or defenses can be proposed. In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic framework for studying attacks and defenses which exist in equilibrium. Under a locally linear decision boundary model for the underlying binary classifier, we prove that the Fast Gradient Method attack and the Randomized Smoothing defense form a Nash Equilibrium. We then show how this equilibrium defense can be approximated given finitely many samples from a data-generating distribution, and derive a generalization bound for the performance of our approximation.
Coded distributed computing (CDC) has emerged as a promising approach because it enables computation tasks to be carried out in a distributed manner while mitigating straggler effects, which often account for the long overall completion times. Specifically, by using polynomial codes, computed results from only a subset of edge servers can be used to reconstruct the final result. However, incentive issues have not been studied systematically for the edge servers to complete the CDC tasks. In this paper, we propose a tractable two-level game-theoretic approach to incentivize the edge servers to complete the CDC tasks. Specifically, in the lower level, a hedonic coalition formation game is formulated where the edge servers share their resources within their coalitions. By forming coalitions, the edge servers have more Central Processing Unit (CPU) power to complete the computation tasks. In the upper level, given the CPU power of the coalitions of edge servers, an all-pay auction is designed to incentivize the edge servers to participate in the CDC tasks. In the all-pay auction, the bids of the edge servers are represented by the allocation of their CPU power to the CDC tasks. The all-pay auction is designed to maximize the utility of the cloud server by determining the allocation of rewards to the winners. Simulation results show that the edge servers are incentivized to allocate more CPU power when multiple rewards are offered, i.e., there are multiple winners, instead of rewarding only the edge server with the largest CPU power allocation. Besides, the utility of the cloud server is maximized when it offers multiple homogeneous rewards, instead of heterogeneous rewards.
The literature on ranking from ordinal data is vast, and there are several ways to aggregate overall preferences from pairwise comparisons between objects. In particular, it is well known that any Nash equilibrium of the zero sum game induced by the preference matrix defines a natural solution concept (winning distribution over objects) known as a von Neumann winner. Many real-world problems, however, are inevitably multi-criteria, with different pairwise preferences governing the different criteria. In this work, we generalize the notion of a von Neumann winner to the multi-criteria setting by taking inspiration from Blackwells approachability. Our framework allows for non-linear aggregation of preferences across criteria, and generalizes the linearization-based approach from multi-objective optimization. From a theoretical standpoint, we show that the Blackwell winner of a multi-criteria problem instance can be computed as the solution to a convex optimization problem. Furthermore, given random samples of pairwise comparisons, we show that a simple plug-in estimator achieves near-optimal minimax sample complexity. Finally, we showcase the practical utility of our framework in a user study on autonomous driving, where we find that the Blackwell winner outperforms the von Neumann winner for the overall preferences.
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