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Register a new userA Game-theoretic Approach Towards Collaborative Coded Computation Offloading
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Jer Shyuan Ng
Publication date
2021
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
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Coded distributed computing (CDC) has emerged as a promising approach because it enables computation tasks to be carried out in a distributed manner while mitigating straggler effects, which often account for the long overall completion times. Specifically, by using polynomial codes, computed results from only a subset of edge servers can be used to reconstruct the final result. However, incentive issues have not been studied systematically for the edge servers to complete the CDC tasks. In this paper, we propose a tractable two-level game-theoretic approach to incentivize the edge servers to complete the CDC tasks. Specifically, in the lower level, a hedonic coalition formation game is formulated where the edge servers share their resources within their coalitions. By forming coalitions, the edge servers have more Central Processing Unit (CPU) power to complete the computation tasks. In the upper level, given the CPU power of the coalitions of edge servers, an all-pay auction is designed to incentivize the edge servers to participate in the CDC tasks. In the all-pay auction, the bids of the edge servers are represented by the allocation of their CPU power to the CDC tasks. The all-pay auction is designed to maximize the utility of the cloud server by determining the allocation of rewards to the winners. Simulation results show that the edge servers are incentivized to allocate more CPU power when multiple rewards are offered, i.e., there are multiple winners, instead of rewarding only the edge server with the largest CPU power allocation. Besides, the utility of the cloud server is maximized when it offers multiple homogeneous rewards, instead of heterogeneous rewards.
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As the amount of data collected for crowdsensing applications increases rapidly due to improved sensing capabilities and the increasing number of Internet of Things (IoT) devices, the cloud server is no longer able to handle the large-scale datasets individually. Given the improved computational capabilities of the edge devices, coded distributed computing has become a promising approach given that it allows computation tasks to be carried out in a distributed manner while mitigating straggler effects, which often account for the long overall completion times. Specifically, by using polynomial codes, computed results from only a subset of devices are needed to reconstruct the final result. However, there is no incentive for the edge devices to complete the computation tasks. In this paper, we present an all-pay auction to incentivize the edge devices to participate in the coded computation tasks. In this auction, the bids of the edge devices are represented by the allocation of their Central Processing Unit (CPU) power to the computation tasks. All edge devices submit their bids regardless of whether they win or lose in the auction. The all-pay auction is designed to maximize the utility of the cloud server by determining the reward allocation to the winners. Simulation results show that the edge devices are incentivized to allocate more CPU power when multiple rewards are offered instead of a single reward.
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