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Register a new userHow weaponizing disinformation can bring down a citys power grid
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Social technologies have made it possible to propagate disinformation and manipulate the masses at an unprecedented scale. This is particularly alarming from a security perspective, as humans have proven to be the weakest link when protecting critical infrastructure in general, and the power grid in particular. Here, we consider an attack in which an adversary attempts to manipulate the behavior of energy consumers by sending fake discount notifications encouraging them to shift their consumption into the peak-demand period. We conduct surveys to assess the propensity of people to follow-through on such notifications and forward them to their friends. This allows us to model how the disinformation propagates through social networks. Finally, using Greater London as a case study, we show that disinformation can indeed be used to orchestrate an attack wherein unwitting consumers synchronize their energy-usage patterns, resulting in blackouts on a city-scale. These findings demonstrate that in an era when disinformation can be weaponized, system vulnerabilities arise not only from the hardware and software of critical infrastructure, but also from the behavior of the consumers.
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Disinformation continues to attract attention due to its increasing threat to society. Nevertheless, a disinformation-based attack on critical infrastructure has never been studied to date. Here, we consider traffic networks and focus on fake information that manipulates drivers decisions to create congestion. We study the optimization problem faced by the adversary when choosing which streets to target to maximize disruption. We prove that finding an optimal solution is computationally intractable, implying that the adversary has no choice but to settle for suboptimal heuristics. We analyze one such heuristic, and compare the cases when targets are spread across the city of Chicago vs. concentrated in its business district. Surprisingly, the latter results in more far-reaching disruption, with its impact felt as far as 2 kilometers from the closest target. Our findings demonstrate that vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure may arise not only from hardware and software, but also from behavioral manipulation.
On many social networking web sites such as Facebook and Twitter, resharing or reposting functionality allows users to share others content with their own friends or followers. As content is reshared from user to user, large cascades of reshares can form. While a growing body of research has focused on analyzing and characterizing such cascades, a recent, parallel line of work has argued that the future trajectory of a cascade may be inherently unpredictable. In this work, we develop a framework for addressing cascade prediction problems. On a large sample of photo reshare cascades on Facebook, we find strong performance in predicting whether a cascade will continue to grow in the future. We find that the relative growth of a cascade becomes more predictable as we observe more of its reshares, that temporal and structural features are key predictors of cascade size, and that initially, breadth, rather than depth in a cascade is a better indicator of larger cascades. This prediction performance is robust in the sense that multiple distinct classes of features all achieve similar performance. We also discover that temporal features are predictive of a cascades eventual shape. Observing independent cascades of the same content, we find that while these cascades differ greatly in size, we are still able to predict which ends up the largest.
Influencing (and being influenced by) others indirectly through social networks is fundamental to all human societies. Whether this happens through the diffusion of rumors, viruses, opinions, or know-how, finding the source is of persistent interest to people and an algorithmic challenge of much current research interest. However, no study has considered the case of diffusion sources actively trying to avoid detection. By disregarding this assumption, we risk conflating intentional obfuscation from the fundamental limitations of source-finding algorithms. We close this gap by separating two mechanisms hiding diffusion sources-one stemming from the network topology itself and the other from strategic manipulation of the network. We find that identifying the source can be challenging even without foul play and, many times, it is easy to evade source-detection algorithms further. We show that hiding connections that were part of the viral cascade is far more effective than introducing fake individuals. Thus, efforts should focus on exposing concealed ties rather than planted fake entities, e.g., bots in social media; such exposure would drastically improve our chances of detecting the source of a social diffusion.
The calculation of centrality measures is common practice in the study of networks, as they attempt to quantify the importance of individual vertices, edges, or other components. Different centralities attempt to measure importance in different ways. In this paper, we examine a conjecture posed by E. Estrada regarding the ability of several measures to distinguish the vertices of networks. Estrada conjectured that if all vertices of a graph have the same subgraph centrality, then all vertices must also have the same degree, eigenvector, closeness, and betweenness centralities. We provide a counterexample for the latter two centrality measures and propose a revised conjecture.
Outbreaks of infectious diseases present a global threat to human health and are considered a major health-care challenge. One major driver for the rapid spatial spread of diseases is human mobility. In particular, the travel patterns of individuals determine their spreading potential to a great extent. These travel behaviors can be captured and modelled using novel location-based data sources, e.g., smart travel cards, social media, etc. Previous studies have shown that individuals who cannot be characterized by their most frequently visited locations spread diseases farther and faster; however, these studies are based on GPS data and mobile call records which have position uncertainty and do not capture explicit contacts. It is unclear if the same conclusions hold for large scale real-world transport networks. In this paper, we investigate how mobility patterns impact disease spread in a large-scale public transit network of empirical data traces. In contrast to previous findings, our results reveal that individuals with mobility patterns characterized by their most frequently visited locations and who typically travel large distances pose the highest spreading risk.
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