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Register a new userEavesdroppers ability to attack a free-space quantum-key-distribution receiver in atmospheric turbulence
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Added by
Poompong Chaiwongkhot
Publication date
2019
fields
Physics
and research's language is
English
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The ability of an eavesdropper (Eve) to perform an intercept-resend attack on a free-space quantum key distribution (QKD) receiver by precisely controlling the incidence angle of an attack laser has been previously demonstrated. However, such an attack could be ineffective in the presence of atmospheric turbulence due to beam wander and spatial mode aberrations induced by the airs varying index of refraction. We experimentally investigate the impact turbulence has on Eves attack on a free-space polarization-encoding QKD receiver by emulating atmospheric turbulence with a spatial light modulator. Our results identify how well Eve would need to compensate for turbulence to perform a successful attack by either reducing her distance to the receiver, or using beam wavefront correction via adaptive optics. Furthermore, we use an entanglement-breaking scheme to find a theoretical limit on the turbulence strength that hinders Eves attack.
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