No Arabic abstract
In this paper, we propose a novel incentive based Demand Response (DR) program with a self reported baseline mechanism. The System Operator (SO) managing the DR program recruits consumers or aggregators of DR resources. The recruited consumers are required to only report their baseline, which is the minimal information necessary for any DR program. During a DR event, a set of consumers, from this pool of recruited consumers, are randomly selected. The consumers are selected such that the required load reduction is delivered. The selected consumers, who reduce their load, are rewarded for their services and other recruited consumers, who deviate from their reported baseline, are penalized. The randomization in selection and penalty ensure that the baseline inflation is controlled. We also justify that the selection probability can be simultaneously used to control SOs cost. This allows the SO to design the mechanism such that its cost is almost optimal when there are no recruitment costs or at least significantly reduced otherwise. Finally, we also show that the proposed method of self-reported baseline outperforms other baseline estimation methods commonly used in practice.
The output of renewable energy fluctuates significantly depending on weather conditions. We develop a unit commitment model to analyze requirements of the forecast output and its error for renewable energies. Our model obtains the time series for the operational state of thermal power plants that would maximize the profits of an electric power utility by taking into account both the forecast of output its error for renewable energies and the demand response of consumers. We consider a power system consisting of thermal power plants, photovoltaic systems (PV), and wind farms and analyze the effect of the forecast error on the operation cost and reserves. We confirm that the operation cost was increases with the forecast error. The effect of a sudden decrease in wind power is also analyzed. More thermal power plants need to be operated to generate power to absorb this sudden decrease in wind power. The increase in the number of operating thermal power plants within a short period does not affect the total operation cost significantly; however the substitution of thermal power plants by wind farms or PV systems is not expected to be very high. Finally, the effects of the demand response in the case of a sudden decrease in wind power are analyzed. We confirm that the number of operating thermal power plants is reduced by the demand response. A power utility has to continue thermal power plants for ensuring supply-demand balance; some of these plants can be decommissioned after installing a large number of wind farms or PV systems, if the demand response is applied using an appropriate price structure.
We introduce and analyze Markov Decision Process (MDP) machines to model individual devices which are expected to participate in future demand-response markets on distribution grids. We differentiate devices into the following four types: (a) optional loads that can be shed, e.g. light dimming; (b) deferrable loads that can be delayed, e.g. dishwashers; (c) controllable loads with inertia, e.g. thermostatically-controlled loads, whose task is to maintain an auxiliary characteristic (temperature) within pre-defined margins; and (d) storage devices that can alternate between charging and generating. Our analysis of the devices seeks to find their optimal price-taking control strategy under a given stochastic model of the distribution market.
Federated learning (FL) serves as a data privacy-preserved machine learning paradigm, and realizes the collaborative model trained by distributed clients. To accomplish an FL task, the task publisher needs to pay financial incentives to the FL server and FL server offloads the task to the contributing FL clients. It is challenging to design proper incentives for the FL clients due to the fact that the task is privately trained by the clients. This paper aims to propose a contract theory based FL task training model towards minimizing incentive budget subject to clients being individually rational (IR) and incentive compatible (IC) in each FL training round. We design a two-dimensional contract model by formally defining two private types of clients, namely data quality and computation effort. To effectively aggregate the trained models, a contract-based aggregator is proposed. We analyze the feasible and optimal contract solutions to the proposed contract model. %Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed framework and contract model can effective improve the generation accuracy of FL tasks. Experimental results show that the generalization accuracy of the FL tasks can be improved by the proposed incentive mechanism where contract-based aggregation is applied.
Federated learning (FL) has shown great potential for addressing the challenge of isolated data islands while preserving data privacy. It allows artificial intelligence (AI) models to be trained on locally stored data in a distributed manner. In order to build an ecosystem for FL to operate in a sustainable manner, it has to be economically attractive to data owners. This gives rise to the problem of FL incentive mechanism design, which aims to find the optimal organizational and payment structure for the federation in order to achieve a series of economic objectives. In this paper, we present a VCG-based FL incentive mechanism, named FVCG, specifically designed for incentivizing data owners to contribute all their data and truthfully report their costs in FL settings. It maximizes the social surplus and minimizes unfairness of the federation. We provide an implementation of FVCG with neural networks and theoretic proofs on its performance bounds. Extensive numerical experiment results demonstrated the effectiveness and economic reasonableness of FVCG.
This paper proposes a novel end-to-end deep learning framework that simultaneously identifies demand baselines and the incentive-based agent demand response model, from the net demand measurements and incentive signals. This learning framework is modularized as two modules: 1) the decision making process of a demand response participant is represented as a differentiable optimization layer, which takes the incentive signal as input and predicts users response; 2) the baseline demand forecast is represented as a standard neural network model, which takes relevant features and predicts users baseline demand. These two intermediate predictions are integrated, to form the net demand forecast. We then propose a gradient-descent approach that backpropagates the net demand forecast errors to update the weights of the agent model and the weights of baseline demand forecast, jointly. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach through computation experiments with synthetic demand response traces and a large-scale real world demand response dataset. Our results show that the approach accurately identifies the demand response model, even without any prior knowledge about the baseline demand.