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Register a new userCascading Denial of Service Attacks on Wi-Fi Networks
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Added by
Liangxiao Xin
Publication date
2016
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
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We unveil the existence of a vulnerability in Wi-Fi, which allows an adversary to remotely launch a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack that propagates both in time and space. This vulnerability stems from a coupling effect induced by hidden nodes. Cascading DoS attacks can congest an entire network and do not require the adversary to violate any protocol. We demonstrate the feasibility of such attacks through experiments with real Wi-Fi cards, extensive ns-3 simulations, and theoretical analysis. The simulations show that the attack is effective both in networks operating under fixed and varying bit rates, as well as ad hoc and infrastructure modes. To gain insight into the root-causes of the attack, we model the network as a dynamical system and analyze its limiting behavior. The model predicts that a phase transition (and hence a cascading attack) is possible when the retry limit parameter of Wi-Fi is greater or equal to 7, and explicitly characterizes the phase transition region in terms of the system parameters.
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