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Added by
Ashish Goel
Publication date
2009
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
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Search auctions have become a dominant source of revenue generation on the Internet. Such auctions have typically used per-click bidding and pricing. We propose the use of hybrid auctions where an advertiser can make a per-impression as well as a per-click bid, and the auctioneer then chooses one of the two as the pricing mechanism. We assume that the advertiser and the auctioneer both have separate beliefs (called priors) on the click-probability of an advertisement. We first prove that the hybrid auction is truthful, assuming that the advertisers are risk-neutral. We then show that this auction is superior to the existing per-click auction in multiple ways: 1) It takes into account the risk characteristics of the advertisers. 2) For obscure keywords, the auctioneer is unlikely to have a very sharp prior on the click-probabilities. In such situations, the hybrid auction can result in significantly higher revenue. 3) An advertiser who believes that its click-probability is much higher than the auctioneers estimate can use per-impression bids to correct the auctioneers prior without incurring any extra cost. 4) The hybrid auction can allow the advertiser and auctioneer to implement complex dynamic programming strategies. As Internet commerce matures, we need more sophisticated pricing models to exploit all the information held by each of the participants. We believe that hybrid auctions could be an important step in this direction.
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We present a deterministic exploration mechanism for sponsored search auctions, which enables the auctioneer to learn the relevance scores of advertisers, and allows advertisers to estimate the true value of clicks generated at the auction site. This exploratory mechanism deviates only minimally from the mechanism being currently used by Google and Yahoo! in the sense that it retains the same pricing rule, similar ranking scheme, as well as, similar mathematical structure of payoffs. In particular, the estimations of the relevance scores and true-values are achieved by providing a chance to lower ranked advertisers to obtain better slots. This allows the search engine to potentially test a new pool of advertisers, and correspondingly, enables new advertisers to estimate the value of clicks/leads generated via the auction. Both these quantities are unknown a priori, and their knowledge is necessary for the auction to operate efficiently. We show that such an exploration policy can be incorporated without any significant loss in revenue for the auctioneer. We compare the revenue of the new mechanism to that of the standard mechanism at their corresponding symmetric Nash equilibria and compute the cost of uncertainty, which is defined as the relative loss in expected revenue per impression. We also bound the loss in efficiency, as well as, in user experience due to exploration, under the same solution concept (i.e. SNE). Thus the proposed exploration mechanism learns the relevance scores while incorporating the incentive constraints from the advertisers who are selfish and are trying to maximize their own profits, and therefore, the exploration is essentially achieved via mechanism design. We also discuss variations of the new mechanism such as truthful implementations.
Standard ad auction formats do not immediately extend to settings where multiple size configurations and layouts are available to advertisers. In these settings, the sale of web advertising space increasingly resembles a combinatorial auction with complementarities, where truthful auctions such as the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) can yield unacceptably low revenue. We therefore study core selecting auctions, which boost revenue by setting payments so that no group of agents, including the auctioneer, can jointly improve their utilities by switching to a different outcome. Our main result is a combinatorial algorithm that finds an approximate bidder optimal core point with almost linear number of calls to the welfare maximization oracle. Our algorithm is faster than previously-proposed heuristics in the literature and has theoretical guarantees. We conclude that core pricing is implementable even for very time sensitive practical use cases such as realtime auctions for online advertising and can yield more revenue. We justify this claim experimentally using the Microsoft Bing Ad Auction data, through which we show our core pricing algorithm generates almost 26% more revenue than VCG on average, about 9% more revenue than other core pricing rules known in the literature, and almost matches the revenue of the standard Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction.
We study auctions for carbon licenses, a policy tool used to control the social cost of pollution. Each identical license grants the right to produce a unit of pollution. Each buyer (i.e., firm that pollutes during the manufacturing process) enjoys a decreasing marginal value for licenses, but society suffers an increasing marginal cost for each license distributed. The seller (i.e., the government) can choose a number of licenses to put up for auction, and wishes to maximize the societal welfare: the total economic value of the buyers minus the social cost. Motivated by emission license markets deployed in practice, we focus on uniform price auctions with a price floor and/or price ceiling. The seller has distributional information about the market, and their goal is to tune the auction parameters to maximize expected welfare. The target benchmark is the maximum expected welfare achievable by any such auction under truth-telling behavior. Unfortunately, the uniform price auction is not truthful, and strategic behavior can significantly reduce (even below zero) the welfare of a given auction configuration. We describe a subclass of safe-price auctions for which the welfare at any Bayes-Nash equilibrium will approximate the welfare under truth-telling behavior. We then show that the better of a safe-price auction, or a truthful auction that allocates licenses to only a single buyer, will approximate the target benchmark. In particular, we show how to choose a number of licenses and a price floor so that the worst-case welfare, at any equilibrium, is a constant approximation to the best achievable welfare under truth-telling after excluding the welfare contribution of a single buyer.
In this work we investigate the strategic learning implications of the deployment of sponsored search auction mechanisms that obey to fairness criteria. We introduce a new class of mechanisms composing a traditional Generalized Second Price auction (GSP) with different fair division schemes to achieve some desired level of fairness between two groups of Bayesian strategic advertisers. We propose two mechanisms, $beta$-Fair GSP and GSP-EFX, that compose GSP with, respectively, an envy-free up to one item (EF1), and an envy-free up to any item (EFX) fair division scheme. The payments of GSP are adjusted in order to compensate the advertisers that suffer a loss of efficiency due the fair division stage. We prove that, for both mechanisms, if bidders play so as to minimize their external regret they are guaranteed to reach an equilibrium with good social welfare. We also prove that the mechanisms are budget balanced, so that the payments charged by the traditional GSP mechanism are a good proxy of the total compensation offered to the advertisers. Finally, we evaluate the quality of the allocations of the two mechanisms through experiments on real-world data.
We study a central problem in Algorithmic Mechanism Design: constructing truthful mechanisms for welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders. Dobzinski, Nisan, and Schapira provided the first mechanism that guarantees a non-trivial approximation ratio of $O(log^2 m)$ [STOC06], where $m$ is the number of items. This was subsequently improved to $O(log mlog log m)$ [Dobzinski, APPROX07] and then to $O(log m)$ [Krysta and Vocking, ICALP12]. In this paper we develop the first mechanism that breaks the logarithmic barrier. Specifically, the mechanism provides an approximation ratio of $O(sqrt {log m})$. Similarly to previous constructions, our mechanism uses polynomially many value and demand queries, and in fact provides the same approximation ratio for the larger class of XOS (a.k.a. fractionally subadditive) valuations. We also develop a computationally efficient implementation of the mechanism for combinatorial auctions with budget additive bidders. Although in general computing a demand query is NP-hard for budget additive valuations, we observe that the specific form of demand queries that our mechanism uses can be efficiently computed when bidders are budget additive.
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