اشترك بالحزمة الذهبية واحصل على وصول غير محدود شمرا أكاديميا
تسجيل مستخدم جديدMyopic Bike and Say Hi: Games for Empathizing with The Myopic
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Myopia is an eye condition that makes it difficult for people to focus on faraway objects. It has become one of the most serious eye conditions worldwide and negatively impacts the quality of life of those who suffer from it. Although myopia is prevalent, many non-myopic people have misconceptions about it and encounter challenges empathizing with myopia situations and those who suffer from it. In this research, we developed two virtual reality (VR) games, (1) Myopic Bike and (2) Say Hi, to provide a means for the non-myopic population to experience the frustration and difficulties of myopic people. Our two games simulate two inconvenient daily life scenarios (riding a bicycle and greeting someone on the street) that myopic people encounter when not wearing glasses. We evaluated four participants game experiences through questionnaires and semi-structured interviews. Overall, our two VR games can create an engaging and non-judgmental experience for the non-myopic population to better understand and empathize with those who suffer from myopia.
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