اشترك بالحزمة الذهبية واحصل على وصول غير محدود شمرا أكاديميا
تسجيل مستخدم جديدPerpetual Voting: The Axiomatic Lens
106
0
0.0
(
0
)
اسأل ChatGPT حول البحث
ﻻ يوجد ملخص باللغة العربية
Perpetual voting was recently introduced as a framework for long-term collective decision making. In this framework, we consider a sequence of subsequent approval-based elections and try to achieve a fair overall outcome. To achieve fairness over time, perpetual voting rules take the history of previous decisions into account and identify voters that were dissatisfied with previous decisions. In this paper, we look at perpetual voting rules from an axiomatic perspective and study two main questions. First, we ask how simple such rules can be while still meeting basic desiderata. For two simple but natural classes, we fully characterize the axiomatic possibilities. Second, we ask how proportionality can be formalized in perpetual voting. We study proportionality on simple profiles that are equivalent to the apportionment setting and show that lower and upper quota axioms can be used to distinguish (and sometimes characterize) perpetual voting rules. Furthermore, we show a surprising connection between a perpetual rule called Perpetual Consensus and Freges apportionment method.
قيم البحث
اقرأ أيضاً
Explaining the decisions of black-box models has been a central theme in the study of trustworthy ML. Numerous measures have been proposed in the literature; however, none of them have been able to adopt a provably causal take on explainability. Buil
ding upon Halpern and Pearls formal definition of a causal explanation, we derive an analogous set of axioms for the classification setting, and use them to derive three explanation measures. Our first measure is a natural adaptation of Chockler and Halperns notion of causal responsibility, whereas the other two correspond to existing game-theoretic influence measures. We present an axiomatic treatment for our proposed indices, showing that they can be uniquely characterized by a set of desirable properties. We compliment this with computational analysis, providing probabilistic approximation schemes for all of our proposed measures. Thus, our work is the first to formally bridge the gap between model explanations, game-theoretic influence, and causal analysis.
Information delivery in a network of agents is a key issue for large, complex systems that need to do so in a predictable, efficient manner. The delivery of information in such multi-agent systems is typically implemented through routing protocols th
at determine how information flows through the network. Different routing protocols exist each with its own benefits, but it is generally unclear which properties can be successfully combined within a given algorithm. We approach this problem from the axiomatic point of view, i.e., we try to establish what are the properties we would seek to see in such a system, and examine the different properties which uniquely define common routing algorithms used today. We examine several desirable properties, such as robustness, which ensures adding nodes and edges does not change the routing in a radical, unpredictable ways; and properties that depend on the operating environment, such as an economic model, where nodes choose their paths based on the cost they are charged to pass information to the next node. We proceed to fully characterize minimal spanning tree, shortest path, and weakest link routing algorithms, showing a tight set of axioms for each.
We propose a new single-winner election method (Schulze method) and prove that it satisfies many academic criteria (e.g. monotonicity, reversal symmetry, resolvability, independence of clones, Condorcet criterion, k-consistency, polynomial runtime).
We then generalize this method to proportional representation by the single transferable vote (Schulze STV) and to methods to calculate a proportional ranking (Schulze proportional ranking). Furthermore, we propose a generalization of the Condorcet criterion to multi-winner elections. This paper contains a large number of examples to illustrate the proposed methods.
Proof-of-work blockchains reward each miner for one completed block by an amount that is, in expectation, proportional to the number of hashes the miner contributed to the mining of the block. Is this proportional allocation rule optimal? And in what
sense? And what other rules are possible? In particular, what are the desirable properties that any good allocation rule should satisfy? To answer these questions, we embark on an axiomatic theory of incentives in proof-of-work blockchains at the time scale of a single block. We consider desirable properties of allocation rules including: symmetry; budget balance (weak or strong); sybil-proofness; and various grades of collusion-proofness. We show that Bitcoins proportional allocation rule is the unique allocation rule satisfying a certain system of properties, but this does not hold for slightly weaker sets of properties, or when the miners are not risk-neutral. We also point out that a rich class of allocation rules can be approximately implemented in a proof-of-work blockchain.
We analyse strategic, complete information, sequential voting with ordinal preferences over the alternatives. We consider several voting mechanisms: plurality voting and approval voting with deterministic or uniform tie-breaking rules. We show that s
trategic voting in these voting procedures may lead to a very undesirable outcome: Condorcet winning alternative might be rejected, Condorcet losing alternative might be elected, and Pareto dominated alternative might be elected. These undesirable phenomena occur already with four alternatives and a small number of voters. For the case of three alternatives we present positive and negative results.
سجل دخول لتتمكن من نشر تعليقات
التعليقات
جاري جلب التعليقات
سجل دخول لتتمكن من متابعة معايير البحث التي قمت باختيارها
