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We discuss a model of an economic community consisting of $N$ interacting agents. The state of each agent at any time is characterized, in general, by a mixed strategy profile drawn from a space of $s$ pure strategies. The community evolves as agents update their strategy profiles in response to payoffs received from other agents. The evolution equation is a generalization of the replicator equation. We argue that when $N$ is sufficiently large and the payoff matrix elements satisfy suitable inequalities, the community evolves to retain the full diversity of available strategies even as individual agents specialize to pure strategies.
Most theories of evolutionary diversification are based on equilibrium assumptions: they are either based on optimality arguments involving static fitness landscapes, or they assume that populations first evolve to an equilibrium state before diversi
Many empirical networks have community structure, in which nodes are densely interconnected within each community (i.e., a group of nodes) and sparsely across different communities. Like other local and meso-scale structure of networks, communities a
Many complex adaptive systems contain a large diversity of specialized components. The specialization at the level of the microscopic degrees of freedom, and diversity at the level of the system as a whole are phenomena that appear during the course
In the face of serious infectious diseases, governments endeavour to implement containment measures such as public vaccination at a macroscopic level. Meanwhile, individuals tend to protect themselves by avoiding contacts with infections at a microsc
Enhanced ind-sheaves provide a suitable framework for the irregular Riemann-Hilbert correspondence. In this paper, we show how Satos specialization and microlocalization functors have a natural enhancement, and discuss some of their properties.