اشترك بالحزمة الذهبية واحصل على وصول غير محدود شمرا أكاديميا
تسجيل مستخدم جديدStable and extremely unequal
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We highlight the tension between stability and equality in non transferable utility matching. We consider many to one matchings and refer to the two sides of the market as students and schools. The latter have aligned preferences, which in this context means that a schools utility is the sum of its students utilities. We show that the unique stable allocation displays extreme inequality between matched pairs.
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