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In this paper we study the optimization problem of an economic agent who chooses a job and the time of retirement as well as consumption and portfolio of assets. The agent is constrained in the ability to borrow against future income. We transform the problem into a dual two-person zero-sum game, which involves a controller, who is a minimizer and chooses a non-increasing process, and a stopper, who is a maximizer and chooses a stopping time. We derive the Hamilton-Jacobi- Bellman quasi-variational inequality(HJBQV) of a max-min type arising from the game. We provide a solution to the HJBQV and verification that it is the value of the game. We establish a duality result which allows to derive the optimal strategies and value function of the primal problem from those of the dual problem.
In this paper we study a Markovian two-dimensional bounded-variation stochastic control problem whose state process consists of a diffusive mean-reverting component and of a purely controlled one. The main problems characteristic lies in the interact
In this paper, we investigate an interesting and important stopping problem mixed with stochastic controls and a textit{nonsmooth} utility over a finite time horizon. The paper aims to develop new methodologies, which are significantly different from
We investigate the optimal portfolio deleveraging (OPD) problem with permanent and temporary price impacts, where the objective is to maximize equity while meeting a prescribed debt/equity requirement. We take the real situation with cross impact amo
A class of infinite horizon optimal control problems involving mixed quasi-norms of $L^p$-type cost functionals for the controls is discussed. These functionals enhance sparsity and switching properties of the optimal controls. The existence of optim
The problem of controlling multi-agent systems under different models of information sharing among agents has received significant attention in the recent literature. In this paper, we consider a setup where rather than committing to a fixed informat