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تسجيل مستخدم جديدExtending On-chain Trust to Off-chain - A Trustworthy Vaccine Shipping Example
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Blockchain creates a secure environment on top of strict cryptographic assumptions and rigorous security proofs. It permits on-chain interactions to achieve trustworthy properties such as traceability, transparency, and accountability. However, current blockchain trustworthiness is only confined to on-chain, creating a trust gap to the physical, off-chain environment. This is due to the lack of a scheme that can truthfully reflect the physical world in a real-time and consistent manner. Such an absence hinders further real-world blockchain applications, especially for security-sensitive ones. In this paper, we propose a scheme to extend blockchain trust from on-chain to off-chain, and take trustworthy vaccine transportation as an example. Our scheme consists of 1) a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)-enabled trusted environment monitoring system built with the Arm Cortex-M33 microcontroller that continuously senses the inside of a vaccine box through trusted sensors and generates anti-forgery data; and 2) a consistency protocol to upload the environment status data from the TEE system to blockchain in a truthful, real-time consistent, continuous and fault-tolerant fashion. Our security analysis indicates that no adversary can tamper with the vaccine in any way without being captured. We carry out an experiment to record the internal status of a vaccine shipping box during transportation, and the results indicate that the proposed system incurs an average latency of 84 ms in local sensing and processing followed by an average latency of 130 ms to have the sensed data transmitted to and available in the blockchain.
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