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تسجيل مستخدم جديدQuantum-access security of the Winternitz one-time signature scheme
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Quantum-access security, where an attacker is granted superposition access to secret-keyed functionalities, is a fundamental security model and its study has inspired results in post-quantum security. We revisit, and fill a gap in, the quantum-access security analysis of the Lamport one-time signature scheme (OTS) in the quantum random oracle model (QROM) by Alagic et al.~(Eurocrypt 2020). We then go on to generalize the technique to the Winternitz OTS. Along the way, we develop a tool for the analysis of hash chains in the QROM based on the superposition oracle technique by Zhandry (Crypto 2019) which might be of independent interest.
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In this paper, an efficient arbitrated quantum signature scheme is proposed by combining quantum cryptographic techniques and some ideas in classical cryptography. In the presented scheme, the signatory and the receiver can share a long-term secret k
ey with the arbitrator by utilizing the key together with a random number. While in previous quantum signature schemes, the key shared between the signatory and the arbitrator or between the receiver and the arbitrator could be used only once, and thus each time when a signatory needs to sign, the signatory and the receiver have to obtain a new key shared with the arbitrator through a quantum key distribution protocol. Detailed theoretical analysis shows that the proposed scheme is efficient and provably secure.
One-time memories (OTMs) are simple, tamper-resistant cryptographic devices, which can be used to implement sophisticated functionalities such as one-time programs. Can one construct OTMs whose security follows from some physical principle? This is n
ot possible in a fully-classical world, or in a fully-quantum world, but there is evidence that OTMs can be built using isolated qubits -- qubits that cannot be entangled, but can be accessed using adaptive sequences of single-qubit measurements. Here we present new constructions for OTMs using isolated qubits, which improve on previous work in several respects: they achieve a stronger single-shot security guarantee, which is stated in terms of the (smoothed) min-entropy; they are proven secure against adversaries who can perform arbitrary local operations and classical communication (LOCC); and they are efficiently implementable. These results use Wiesners idea of conjugate coding, combined with error-correcting codes that approach the capacity of the q-ary symmetric channel, and a high-order entropic uncertainty relation, which was originally developed for cryptography in the bounded quantum storage model.
One-time programs are modelled after a black box that allows a single evaluation of a function, and then self-destructs. Because software can, in principle, be copied, general one-time programs exists only in the hardware token model: it has been sho
wn that any function admits a one-time program as long as we assume access to physical devices called one-time memories. Quantum information, with its well-known property of no-cloning, would, at first glance, prevent the basic copying attack for classical programs. We show that this intuition is false: one-time programs for both classical and quantum maps, based solely on quantum information, do not exist, even with computational assumptions. We complement this strong impossibility proof by an equally strong possibility result: assuming the same basic one-time memories as used for classical one-time programs, we show that every quantum map has a quantum one-time program that is secure in the universal composability framework. Our construction relies on a new, simpler quantum authentication scheme and corresponding mechanism for computing on authenticated data.
Until now, there have been developed many arbitrated quantum signature schemes implemented with a help of a trusted third party. In order to guarantee the unconditional security, most of them take advantage of the optimal quantum one-time encryption
method based on Pauli operators. However, we in this paper point out that the previous schemes only provides a security against total break and actually show that there exists a simple existential forgery attack to validly modify the transmitted pair of message and signature. In addition, we also provide a simple method to recover the security against the proposed attack.
We prove the security of theoretical quantum key distribution against the most general attacks which can be performed on the channel, by an eavesdropper who has unlimited computation abilities, and the full power allowed by the rules of classical and
quantum physics. A key created that way can then be used to transmit secure messages such that their security is also unaffected in the future.
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