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We study wisdom of the crowd effects in liquid democracy when agents are allowed to apportion weights to proxies by mixing their delegations. We show that in this setting -- unlike in the standard one where votes are always delegated in full to one proxy -- it becomes possible to identify delegation structures that optimize the truth-tracking accuracy of the group. We contrast this centralized solution with the group accuracy obtained in equilibrium when agents interact by greedily trying to maximize their own individual accuracy through mixed delegations, and study the price of anarchy of these games. While equilibria with mixed delegations may be as bad as in the standard delegations setting, they are never worse and may sometimes be better.
The paper develops a theory of power for delegable proxy voting systems. We define a power index able to measure the influence of both voters and delegators. Using this index, which we characterize axiomatically, we extend an earlier game-theoretic m
Liquid democracy is a proxy voting method where proxies are delegable. We propose and study a game-theoretic model of liquid democracy to address the following question: when is it rational for a voter to delegate her vote? We study the existence of
We consider a scheduling problem where a cloud service provider has multiple units of a resource available over time. Selfish clients submit jobs, each with an arrival time, deadline, length, and value. The service providers goal is to implement a tr
Most modern recommendation systems use the approach of collaborative filtering: users that are believed to behave alike are used to produce recommendations. In this work we describe an application (Liquid FM) taking a completely different approach. L
In many settings, an effective way of evaluating objects of interest is to collect evaluations from dispersed individuals and to aggregate these evaluations together. Some examples are categorizing online content and evaluating student assignments vi