اشترك بالحزمة الذهبية واحصل على وصول غير محدود شمرا أكاديميا
تسجيل مستخدم جديدEnd-Users Knowledge and Perception about Security of Mobile Health Apps: An Empirical Study
203
0
0.0
(
0
)
اسأل ChatGPT حول البحث
ﻻ يوجد ملخص باللغة العربية
Mobile health applications (mHealth apps for short) are being increasingly adopted in the healthcare sector, enabling stakeholders such as governments, health units, medics, and patients, to utilize health services in a pervasive manner. Despite having several known benefits, mHealth apps entail significant security and privacy challenges that can lead to data breaches with serious social, legal, and financial consequences. This research presents an empirical investigation about security awareness of end-users of mHealth apps that are available on major mobile platforms, including Android and iOS. We collaborated with two mHealth providers in Saudi Arabia to survey 101 end-users, investigating their security awareness about (i) existing and desired security features, (ii) security related issues, and (iii) methods to improve security knowledge. Findings indicate that majority of the end-users are aware of the existing security features provided by the apps (e.g., restricted app permissions); however, they desire usable security (e.g., biometric authentication) and are concerned about privacy of their health information (e.g., data anonymization). End-users suggested that protocols such as session timeout or Two-factor authentication (2FA) positively impact security but compromise usability of the app. Security-awareness via social media, peer guidance, or training from app providers can increase end-users trust in mHealth apps. This research investigates human-centric knowledge based on empirical evidence and provides a set of guidelines to develop secure and usable mHealth apps.
قيم البحث
اقرأ أيضاً
Mobile systems offer portable and interactive computing, empowering users, to exploit a multitude of context-sensitive services, including mobile healthcare. Mobile health applications (i.e., mHealth apps) are revolutionizing the healthcare sector by
enabling stakeholders to produce and consume healthcare services. A widespread adoption of mHealth technologies and rapid increase in mHealth apps entail a critical challenge, i.e., lack of security awareness by end-users regarding health-critical data. This paper presents an empirical study aimed at exploring the security awareness of end-users of mHealth apps. We collaborated with two mHealth providers in Saudi Arabia to gather data from 101 end-users. The results reveal that despite having the required knowledge, end-users lack appropriate behaviour , i.e., reluctance or lack of understanding to adopt security practices, compromising health-critical data with social, legal, and financial consequences. The results emphasize that mHealth providers should ensure security training of end-users (e.g., threat analysis workshops), promote best practices to enforce security (e.g., multi-step authentication), and adopt suitable mHealth apps (e.g., trade-offs for security vs usability). The study provides empirical evidence and a set of guidelines about security awareness of mHealth apps.
Third-party security apps are an integral part of the Android app ecosystem. Many users install them as an extra layer of protection for their devices. There are hundreds of such security apps, both free and paid in Google Play Store and some of them
are downloaded millions of times. By installing security apps, the smartphone users place a significant amount of trust towards the security companies who developed these apps, because a fully functional mobile security app requires access to many smartphone resources such as the storage, text messages and email, browser history, and information about other installed applications. Often these resources contain highly sensitive personal information. As such, it is essential to understand the mobile security apps ecosystem to assess whether is it indeed beneficial to install them. To this end, in this paper, we present the first empirical study of Android security apps. We analyse 100 Android security apps from multiple aspects such as metadata, static analysis, and dynamic analysis and presents insights to their operations and behaviours. Our results show that 20% of the security apps we studied potentially resell the data they collect from smartphones to third parties; in some cases, even without the user consent. Also, our experiments show that around 50% of the security apps fail to identify malware installed on a smartphone.
Mobile banking apps, belonging to the most security-critical app category, render massive and dynamic transactions susceptible to security risks. Given huge potential financial loss caused by vulnerabilities, existing research lacks a comprehensive e
mpirical study on the security risks of global banking apps to provide useful insights and improve the security of banking apps. Since data-related weaknesses in banking apps are critical and may directly cause serious financial loss, this paper first revisits the state-of-the-art available tools and finds that they have limited capability in identifying data-related security weaknesses of banking apps. To complement the capability of existing tools in data-related weakness detection, we propose a three-phase automated security risk assessment system, named AUSERA, which leverages static program analysis techniques and sensitive keyword identification. By leveraging AUSERA, we collect 2,157 weaknesses in 693 real-world banking apps across 83 countries, which we use as a basis to conduct a comprehensive empirical study from different aspects, such as global distribution and weakness evolution during version updates. We find that apps owned by subsidiary banks are always less secure than or equivalent to those owned by parent banks. In addition, we also track the patching of weaknesses and receive much positive feedback from banking entities so as to improve the security of banking apps in practice. To date, we highlight that 21 banks have confirmed the weaknesses we reported. We also exchange insights with 7 banks, such as HSBC in UK and OCBC in Singapore, via in-person or online meetings to help them improve their apps. We hope that the insights developed in this paper will inform the communities about the gaps among multiple stakeholders, including banks, academic researchers, and third-party security companies.
In this paper, we present an end-to-end view of IoT security and privacy and a case study. Our contribution is three-fold. First, we present our end-to-end view of an IoT system and this view can guide risk assessment and design of an IoT system. We
identify 10 basic IoT functionalities that are related to security and privacy. Based on this view, we systematically present security and privacy requirements in terms of IoT system, software, networking and big data analytics in the cloud. Second, using the end-to-end view of IoT security and privacy, we present a vulnerability analysis of the Edimax IP camera system. We are the first to exploit this system and have identified various attacks that can fully control all the cameras from the manufacturer. Our real-world experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of the discovered attacks and raise the alarms again for the IoT manufacturers. Third, such vulnerabilities found in the exploit of Edimax cameras and our previous exploit of Edimax smartplugs can lead to another wave of Mirai attacks, which can be either botnets or worm attacks. To systematically understand the damage of the Mirai malware, we model propagation of the Mirai and use the simulations to validate the modeling. The work in this paper raises the alarm again for the IoT device manufacturers to better secure their products in order to prevent malware attacks like Mirai.
Knowledge flow analysis offers a simple and flexible way to find flaws in security protocols. A protocol is described by a collection of rules constraining the propagation of knowledge amongst principals. Because this characterization corresponds clo
sely to informal descriptions of protocols, it allows a succinct and natural formalization; because it abstracts away message ordering, and handles communications between principals and applications of cryptographic primitives uniformly, it is readily represented in a standard logic. A generic framework in the Alloy modelling language is presented, and instantiated for two standard protocols, and a new key management scheme.
سجل دخول لتتمكن من نشر تعليقات
التعليقات
جاري جلب التعليقات
سجل دخول لتتمكن من متابعة معايير البحث التي قمت باختيارها
