اشترك بالحزمة الذهبية واحصل على وصول غير محدود شمرا أكاديميا
تسجيل مستخدم جديدCountermeasure against quantum hacking using detection statistics
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Detector blinding attacks have been proposed in the last few years, and they could potentially threaten the security of QKD systems. Even though no complete QKD system has been hacked yet, it is nevertheless important to consider countermeasures to avoid information leakage. In this paper, we present a new countermeasure against these kind of attacks based on the use of multi-pixel detectors. We show that with this method, we are able to estimate an upper bound on the information an eavesdropper could have on the key exchanged. Finally, we test a multi-pixel detector based on SNSPDs to show it can fulfill all the requirement for our countermeasure to be effective.
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