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This paper combines two key ingredients for online algorithms - competitive analysis (e.g. the competitive ratio) and advice complexity (e.g. the number of advice bits needed to improve online decisions) - in the context of a simple online fair division model where items arrive one by one and are allocated to agents via some mechanism. We consider four such online mechanisms: the popular Ranking matching mechanism adapted from online bipartite matching and the Like, Balanced Like and Maximum Like allocation mechanisms firstly introduced for online fair division problems. Our first contribution is that we perform a competitive analysis of these mechanisms with respect to the expected size of the matching, the utilitarian welfare, and the egalitarian welfare. We also suppose that an oracle can give a number of advice bits to the mechanisms. Our second contribution is to give several impossibility results; e.g. no mechanism can achieve the egalitarian outcome of the optimal offline mechanism supposing they receive partial advice from the oracle. Our third contribution is that we quantify the competitive performance of these four mechanisms w.r.t. the number of oracle requests they can make. We thus present a most-competitive mechanism for each objective.
We study a new but simple model for online fair division in which indivisible items arrive one-by-one and agents have monotone utilities over bundles of the items. We consider axiomatic properties of mechanisms for this model such as strategy-proofne
Two simple and attractive mechanisms for the fair division of indivisible goods in an online setting are LIKE and BALANCED LIKE. We study some fundamental computational problems concerning the outcomes of these mechanisms. In particular, we consider
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We consider fair division problems where indivisible items arrive one-by-one in an online fashion and are allocated immediately to agents who have additive utilities over these items. Many existing offline mechanisms do not work in this online settin